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Designing a "System for Idiots": An
Analysis of the Impracticality of Davis v.

United States on Ambiguous Waivers of the

Right to the Presence of Counsel
INTRODUCTION

On August 29, 1989, Patrick Eastlack escaped from the Arizona
Department of Correction's Wilmot facility in Tucson while serving a nineyear prison sentence.' After hiding all night in the desert, Eastlack
eventually ended up swimming at a townhouse complex on August 30.2 He
proceeded to break into a nearby house to make phone calls, leaving behind
a number of fingerprints.' The next morning, Eastlack found a vacant
house for sale, where he consumed alcoholic beverages, used the phone, ate
food, and stole several items of personal property, including jewelry and a
handgun.4 Before leaving his temporary motel, Eastlack set fire to the
home.5 Eastlack's next stop was at the house of 85-year-old Leicester
Sherrill and his 82-year-old wife, Katherine. 6 There, 21-year-old Eastlack,
with previous martial arts training, proceeded to inflict 57 wounds on
Leicester, including a wound caused by striking him with a chair leg.7 Mrs.
Both were left
Sherrill, weighing 90 pounds, received 37 wounds.
barricaded in a bedroom, bleeding and dying, while Eastlack departed in the
Sherrill's car for El Paso, Texas. 9 Eastlack was apprehended in El Paso,
but not before a flight to and from Miami, Florida.'

1.
(1995).
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

State v. Eastlack, 883 P.2d 999, 1003 (Ariz. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1978
Id.
Id. at 1003-04.
Id. at 1004.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Before Detective Pantke of the Pima County Sheriff's office questioned
Eastlack at an El Paso police station, Eastlack was read his Miranda rights;
Eastlack agreed to answer questions." Eastlack first denied any involvement in the aforementioned crimes.'2 To this, the detective asked, "What
if I told you that your prints were also in the arson house?" and Eastlack's
tone began to change.' 3 The dialogue proceeded as follows:
Q: Do you remember burning the house?
A: Yeah.
Q: What else did you take from the house when you got the ring?
A: Uh-Q: How about the necklace you're wearing, John?
A: Yeah, that.
Q: How about the gun?
A: I think I better talk to a lawyer first.
Q: Okay. Does that mean you don't wanna talk to me anymore?
A: Not about that, no. What about the burglaries?
Q: As far as the burglary is--does that mean you wanna talk to me
again?
A: Sure.
Q: Okay. 'Cause you already asked for an attorney. You said
you didn't want, you didn't wanna talk to me, then you asked for
an attorney, but now you're asking to talk to me again, just so I,
just so I'm clear in my mind.
A: Right.
Q: You, you do wanna talk to me?
A: Sure. '
As the interview continued, Eastlack admitted his involvement in the crimes
for which he was eventually charged, including the murders.'"
In 1966, the United States Supreme Court handed down the landmark
decision Miranda v. Arizona, 6 establishing the now infamous Miranda
Rights. 7 These rights are to be read upon the arrest of a suspect, inform11. Eastlack, 883 P.2d at 1005.
12. Id.
13. Id.

14. Id.
15. Id.

16. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

17. A person in custody, subjected to interrogation, must be informed in "clear and

unequivocal terms" that they have to remain silent. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-68.
Accompanied with the right to remain silent is the explanation that anything the individual
says can and will be used against then in court. Id. at 469. That individual also has the right
to the presence of counsel at interrogation. Id. at 469. If that person is indigent, the person
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ing that suspect of their advancement to the "accused" category, a connotation which carries with it a list of coveted Court-designed rights. Included
in the list is the right to have counsel present during interrogation. Once a
suspect affirmatively invokes this right to the presence of counsel, Edwards
v. Arizona 8 held that questioning must cease and counsel must be provided
for.
Problems arise when a suspect gives neither a definitive "yes" nor "no"
reply to the question. Lower courts have been struggling with how to
handle this delicate matter for several years. Amidst mass confusion and
absent Supreme Court guidance, three main trends in approaching the matter
arose. 9 In 1994, the issue reached the Supreme Court at last.
Davis v. United States20 was decided in hopes of unifying the lower
courts' approaches to ambiguous or equivocal waivers of the right to counsel, while at the same time providing guidance to interrogating officials as
to how to solve the situation in practice. Davis held, in short, that upon an
ambiguous or equivocal waiver of a suspect's right to the presence of
counsel, interrogating officers are no longer required to clarify the exact
wishes of the suspect; however, clarifying questions may be posed to the
suspect if the officer should so desire.2 ' The Miranda warnings are
sufficient in and of themselves, the Court held, and there is no need to
extend Edwards to include a third layer of prophylaxis. To do so, according
to Justice Scalia, would be to protect a suspect from their own inarticulateness. As Scalia announced during the Court proceedings, "We cannot run
22
a system for idiots.
In the aforementioned fact pattern, Eastlack argued on appeal to the
Supreme Court of Arizona that his statement, "I think I better talk to a
lawyer first," was at best an equivocal assertion of his right to counsel.23
If this were true, he argued, then any subsequent admissions were inadmissible in a court of law.24 Relying on Davis v. United States, the Supreme
Court of Arizona was not convinced. The court ruled that the statement was
must be told that a lawyer will be appointed to represent them. Id. at 473 (quoting Miranda,
384 U.S. at 472) ("While authorities are not required to relieve the accused of his poverty,
they have the obligation not to take advantage of indigence in the administration of justice.").
18. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
19. See infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
20. 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994).
21. Id. at 2356-57.
22. Major Matthew Winter, Do You Really Want a Lawyer?, 1994-JUN ARMY LAW.
54, 55 (1994).
23. Eastlack, 883 P.2d at 1005. This was only one of many issues raised, but the only
one relevant for purposes of this casenote.
24. Id.
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in fact equivocal, since Eastlack used the words "I think I better talk to a
lawyer first," and further that there was absolutely no evidence of psychological pressure.25 In addition, since Eastlack had prior experience with
such questioning, he was familiar with the process, and should have been
able to affirmatively invoke his right to counsel's presence.26 Finally, the
court ruled that even if the statement was an invocation of his right to
counsel, the resulting error was harmless in light of the overwhelming
evidence against Eastlack, including fingerprints, phone calls, and admissions. The detective's questioning was fully in line with Davis, including
clarifying questioning not even required by the Davis decision.27 Eastlack's
conviction stood.
The Eastlack scenario raises several questions. First, and most
obviously, is the statement "I think I better talk to a lawyer first" truly an
ambiguous reference to desiring counsel's presence? Second, is the Davis
holding, that no further clarifying questions need be asked after such a
statement, truly a prudent practice? In other words, would clarifying
questions at that exact point save the courts from such controversies, or
would clarifying questioning in fact result in a form of police coercion in
the quest for a confession? Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, is the
issue of one's clarity in invoking the right to the presence of counsel worthy
of even constituting an issue when, as in Eastlack's case, there is a wealth
of evidence against a defendant? And, if there is such an abundance of
evidence, should police and the courts be so fearful of allowing an
attorney's presence during questioning?
Eastlack is a prime example of the Davis decision's limitations. There,
as in all Davis applications, the police are afforded a degree of protection
removed from the defendant; absent a definitive waiver, subsequent
confessions are admissible. However, whereas the police are aware of this
new requirement, the average suspect is not. It may be difficult to sympathize with a suspect who cannot clearly say "yes" or "no," especially with
a suspect such as Eastlack with such a wealth of evidence of violence
against him. But, what if the suspect had instead unwittingly passed a bad
check? Or, what if drugs were obtained from a suspect's apartment after a
warrantless search? What if a suspect spoke English as a second language,
making him unableto clearly articulate his intent? One's initial reaction
may be to embrace the Davis decision, but scenarios such as these warrant
a deeper analysis into Davis's universal practicality.

25. Id. at 1007.
26. Id.

27. Id. at 1006.
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The Davis decision has done anything but unify the lower courts'
handling of the issue. The few courts that have followed the decision have
used it primarily as a scapegoat to avoid more pressing issues. In practice,
the Davis holding is not effective; it does not promote the well established
judiciary goals of protecting suspects' rights, in that confused and intimidated suspects subjected to the coercive interrogation environment lose their
rights and remain misguided as to what their given rights actually are. Most
importantly, the Davis decision ignores perhaps the most important
requirement of Miranda,that a suspect's waiver must be given "knowing[ly]
and intelligent[ly]." 2 8 Instead, the Court has unacceptably placed the
burden of a mastery of the law on the intimidated suspect, rather than on the
more appropriately placed police officer who is well versed in the law. As
facially intriguing as Justice Scalia's comment may seem, perhaps the time
has indeed come to "run a system for idiots."
This article will scrutinize the Davis opinion and show why the holding
is not feasible in practice. It will begin by tracing the history of judicial
approaches to the ambiguous waiver of counsel question, just prior to the
Davis decision. A summary of the case facts will follow, as well as a
detailed outline of the Court's opinion. The article will conclude with an
analysis of the decision and why it is unworkable, as well as a possible
proposal (based on historical analysis) to remedy the currently flawed
situation.
I.

HISTORY

A familiar starting point for many courts to analyze a suspect's right
to counsel is Johnson v. Zerbst.29 This case, one of the first to discuss the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, highlighted the common defendant's
need for attorney representation;30 this is because the average defendant
32
lacks the requisite skill 31 and knowledge of the intricacies of the law.

28. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469-73 (1966).
29. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
30. Id. at 462-64. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
in part: "Inall criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to have assistance
of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST., amend. VI. As the Zerbst Court explains, this is
one of the safeguards necessary to insure the fundamental rights of life and liberty. Zerbst,
304 U.S. at 462.
31. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 462-63.
32. The Zerbst Court further emphasized this point by quoting Powell v. Alabama:
If charged with a crime, even the educated layperson is incapable,
generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or
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Though the decision centered primarily upon Sixth Amendment considerations, Zerbst laid the groundwork for future courts to expand suspects'
rights to counsel at other stages of the accusatorial process as well.
An example is the 1964 case Escobedo v. Illinois, 33 which carried the.
right to counsel throughout even the interrogation process. Escobedo
involved a suspect who was denied all contact with his attorney until police
interrogation was completed, this despite the fact that his attorney was
present at nearly every stage of the arresting process. 34 Though the interrogation took place before the suspect was actually indicted formally, the
Court found this fact irrelevant; 3 the suspect in Escobedo, the Court held,
had moved to the illusive category of the accused. 6 Without informing the
defendant of his constitutional rights, the police did everything possible to
compel a confession of the defendant's alleged murder. 37 A society based
solely on confessions, rather than physical evidence obtained independently
of the suspect's testimony, the Court feared, would become less reliable and
more subject to abuses. 3 Escobedo's ultimate holding is that a suspect

bad. He is unfamiiiar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of
counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon
incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise
inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare
his defence (sic), even though he have a perfect one. He requires the
guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 463 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932)).
33. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
34. Id. at 478-85. But see Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986). There, a public

defender's efforts to reach the suspect were thwarted by local police. The Court held that
police can deliberately deceive an attorney, unbeknownst to the suspect, without affecting the
suspect's ability to invoke her Miranda rights. Id. at 418. A clear distinction between the
two cases can be drawn: in Moran, the suspect was unaware of the attorney's efforts,
whereas in Escobedo, the suspect's wishes to speak with his counsel were wrongfully
quashed by police.
35. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 485. Quotes from Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201
(1964) supported this finding:
[A] Constitution which guarantees a defendant the aid of counsel at...
trial could surely vouchsafe no less to an indicted defendant under
interrogation by the police in a completely extrajudicial proceeding.
Anything less . . . might deny a defendant effective representation by
counsel "at the only stage when legal aid and advice would help him."
Massiah, 377 U.S. at 204 (quoting Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 326 (1959) (Douglas,
J., concurring)).
36. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 485.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 488-89. A powerful quote by the Escobedo Court reads as follows:
We have also learned the companion lesson of history that no system of
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improperly denied of his right to consult with39counsel cannot have
incriminating statements used against him in court.
The Escobedo case was quickly followed by the now famous Miranda
v. Arizona.40 Thoughthe Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches only
at the beginning of formal, adversarial criminal proceedings, 4' and before
those proceedings are initiated a suspect has no constitutional fight to the
assistance of counsel,42 Miranda held that a suspect subject to custodial
interrogation has a right to consult with an attorney and to have that attorney
present during the interrogation process. 43 However, unlike the Sixth
Amendment right, the Miranda right to counsel attaches only when a
suspect invokes this right during custodial interrogation." Further, police
must advise a suspect of these valuable fights before questioning begins. 4,
This right to counsel is one of a series of recommended "procedural
safeguards" that were not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but

criminal justice can, or should, survive if it comes to depend for its
continued effectiveness on the citizens' abdication through unawareness of
their constitutional rights. No system worth preserving should have to fear
that if an accused is permitted to consult with a lawyer, he will become
aware of, and exercise, these rights. If the exercise of constitutional rights
will thwart the effectiveness of a system of law enforcement, then there is
something very wrong with that system.
Id. at 490 (citations omitted).
39. Id.

40. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

41. See United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 (1984); Brewer v. Williams, 430
U.S. 387, 404 (1977) ("[T]he right to counsel does not depend upon a request by the
defendant.").
42. See Davis v. United States, 114 S.Ct. at 2354.
43: Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469-73.
44. Id. at 444-45. In McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 176 (1991), Justice Scalia
clarified the difference between the Fifth and Sixth Amendments as follows:
The purpose of the Sixth Amendment counsel guarantee--and hence the
purpose of invoking it--is to "protec[t] the unaided layman at critical
confrontations" with his "expert adversary," the government, after "the
adverse positions of government and defendant have solidified" with respect
to a particular alleged crime. The purpose of the Miranda-Edwards
guarantee, on the other hand--and hence the purpose of invoking it--is to
protect a quite different interest: the suspect's "desire to deal with the
police only through counsel" ... [To] invoke the Sixth Amendment interest
is, as a matter of fact, not to invoke the Miranda-Edwards interest. One
might be quite willing to speak to the police without counsel present
concerning many matters, but not the matter under prosecution.
Id. at 177-78 (citations omitted).
45. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45. See also supra note 17.
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were instead measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-in46
crimination was protected.
The Miranda decision was later revised by Edwards v. Arizona.4 7
Justice White's opinion in Edwards" devised a "second layer of prophylaxis for the Miranda right to counsel, '49 requiring all police questioning to
cease once the suspect has affirmatively invoked their right to counsel.50

If a suspect clearly waives his right to counsel, then police may question
him; 5 but if he requests counsel to be present at any time in the interroga-

tion, Edwards requires a cessation of all questioning until that consultation
has been made possible.52 The motive behind this requirement is to
prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously
asserted Miranda rights.53 Similar to other aspects of Miranda, this

prohibition on further questioning (coerced confessions) is not required by

the Fifth Amendment, but rather is justified "only by reference to its
54
prophylactic purpose.

46. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 443-44 (1974). Though Zerbst and
Escobedo are essential cases to understanding the history of the right to counsel, most
modem courts begin their analysis with the Miranda decision.
47. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
48. Justice Burger wrote a concurring opinion in Edwards, as did Justice Powell. It
is interesting to note that Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Powell's concurring opinion,
which stated in part: "Although I agree ... I do not join the Court's opinion because I am
not sure what it means." Later, the concurrence stated, "If read to create a new per se rule,
requiring a threshold inquiry as to precisely who opened any conversation between an
accused and state officials, I cannot agree. I would not superimpose a new element of proof
on the established doctrine of waiver of counsel." Edwards, 451 U.S. at 489-90.
Justice Rehnquist later agreed with Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Davis,
which holds, per Edwards' "bright line rule," that a suspect's statements must be proven clear
and unambiguous before interrogation must cease. This new element of proof required by
Davis seems an ironic contradiction to Justice Rehnquist's feelings in Edwards.
49. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 176 (1991).
50. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85.
51. See North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 372-76 (1979).
52. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85. Such a consultation is provided for when the
suspect is actually able to speak with her attorney; however, prior to interrogation, previous
consultations with counsel do not preclude a suspect from speaking with that attorney again.
Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990). In Minnick, a suspect had invoked his
Miranda right to counsel, spoke with that counsel twice, then gave incriminating statements
during interrogation absent his counsel. Id. at 150. These statements were inadmissible
because "A single consultation with an attorney does not remove the suspect from persistent
attempts by officials to persuade him to waive his rights, or from the coercive pressures that
accompany custody and that may increase as custody is prolonged." Id. at 153.
53. See Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990).
54. Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528 (1987).
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While resolving questions in many aspects of a suspect's right to
counsel, the Edwards holding also unwittingly introduced a new dimension
to the paradox: how should the Court handle a suspect's ambiguous or
equivocal waiver of the right to counsel? Ultimately, with no guiding
precedent available, lower courts adopted varying attacks for handling this
new dilemma, evinced primarily in three general trends. The Supreme Court
twice took an opportunity to address these distinct approaches in Smith v.
Illinois" and Connecticut v. Barrett,56 though in neither instance did the
Court do little more than acknowledge the trends in fact existed. The Smith
case outlined these three approaches lower courts utilized:
Some courts have held that all questioning must cease upon any
request for or reference to counsel, however equivocal or ambiguous; ... Others have attempted to define a threshold standard of
clarity for such requests, and have held that requests falling below
this threshold do not trigger the right to counsel; ... Still others
have adopted a third approach, holding that when an accused
makes an equivocal statement that "arguably" can be construed as
a request for counsel, all interrogation must immediately cease
except for narrow questions designed to "clarify" the earlier
statement and the accused's desires respecting counsel."
Based on "clear logical force of settled precedent," the majority held that an
accused's statements cannot be used against him to cast doubt on his
previously asserted waiver of counsel.5"
The Barrett case provided little more guidance. In a majority opinion
written by Justice Rehnquist (who, recall, had dissented three years
previously in Smith), the Court found the accused's statements admissi-

55. 469 U.S. 91 (1984) (per curiam).
56. 479 U.S. 523 (1987).
57. Smith, 469 U.S. at 96 n.3.

58. Id. at 99-100. The dissent in the Smith case, however, written by Justice
Rehnquist, had the following to say:
Common sense suggests that the police should both complete reading
petitioner his ights and then ask him to state clearly what he elects to do,
even if he indicated a tentative desire while he was being informed of his
rights. This is entirely consistent with applicable language in Miranda
itself.
Id. at 104. Note, here, that Justice Rehnquist was later a member of the Davis majority that
would not require clarifying questions in response to ambiguous waivers. Justice Rehnquist,
also recall, was a member of the Edwards concurrence that was unwilling to "superimpose
a new element of proof on the established doctrine of waiver of counsel." Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 489-90 (1981).
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ble. 59 Barrett told the police before questioning that he refused to give any
written statements, but he had no qualms with speaking about the incident. 60 Before police began questioning, they again read Barrett his rights,
and he reemphasized he would only speak with them orally. 6' When the
tape recorder malfunctioned during questioning, police again advised Barrett
of his rights under Miranda; Barrett for a third time gave the same response,
and the interrogation continued. 62 After yet another malfunction, the
interrogating officer abandoned taping the transaction and instead wrote
down Barrett's statements, an act that would seem to directly oppose what
Barrett had requested.63
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion found no violations of Barrett's
constitutional rights." 4 Barrett's statements were held unambiguous; he had
not effectively requested counsel. 65 Absent ambiguous statements, the
Court saw no reason to address the issue of how to handle such counsel
references, as addressed previously in Smith. 66 Once again, the Supreme
Court successfully avoided resolving this glaring inconsistency. 67

59. Barrett, 479 U.S. at 525-26.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 529-30.
65. Id. at 530.
66. Id.
67. Again, even though Smith and Barrettdo not make a final decision as to how to
handle ambiguous references to waiving the right to counsel, the cases do in fact point out
the three above noted trends in the lower courts. These trends can be seen in the following
cases: The Sixth, Eighth, and.Tenth Circuits are examples of courts that advocate the first
approach in Smith, that all questioning must cease after an ambiguous reference to waiving
counsel. See Maglio v. Jago, 580 F.2d 202 (6th Cir. 1978); Howard v. Pung, 862 F.2d 1348
(8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 920 (1989); United States v. March, 999 F.2d 456
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 483 (1993).
The second approach outlined in Smith is the least advocated, though note that Davis
seems to be advocating this approach in effect. See also Thompson v. Wainright, 601 F.2d
768 (5th Cir. 1979), where ambiguous waivers can be clarified by police questions, but need
not necessarily be, similar to Davis.
The most often advocated Smith approach is the third, that following an ambiguous
waiver of the right to counsel, all police questioning must cease with the exception of
clarifying questions as to what the suspect truly wants. This trend can be seen in the First,
Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits generally. See United States v. Porter, 776 F.2d
370 (1st Cir. 1985), cert..denied, 481 U.S. 1048 (1987) though there the court was reluctant
to devise a per se rule; United States v. Gotay, 844 F.2d 971 (2nd Cir. 1988), where the
statements "no, no, I am very afraid. I don't want to talk in front of these people," spoken
by the suspect after her rights were read, were held to be ambiguous "at the very least";
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Despite the obvious lack of uniformity among lower courts, the
Supreme Court did little to specify exactly how an ambiguous waiver of a
suspect's right to counsel should be treated. However, in 1993, one year
before the Davis decision, a noticeable change in Supreme Court thinking
was seen in Mueller v. Virginia.68 In that case, the suspect asked interrogating authorities, "Do you think I need an attorney here," which was
answered by a reassuring officer shaking his head from side to side, stating,
"You're just talking to us."' 69 The trial court refused to suppress the
confessions, holding that statement an invalid waiver of counsel, and thus
the officer had not violated Mueller's right to seek counsel.7" Though the
Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, 7 the Supreme Court of the United
States refused to hear the issue, and Mueller's conviction, resulting in a
death sentence, was left untouched.72 In a brief dissent to the Court's
decision, however, Justice White, with whom Justices Blackmun and Souter
joined, wrote that "[tihe Court should take this opportunity to resolve this
important constitutional question."03 These three Justices, at least, recognized the potentially disastrous effects of an unconsolidated constitutional
approach. That dissent marked the first time the Court acknowledged the
need for a solution, and foreshadowed the inevitable Davis decision.
The following year, the Davis case was decided in the United States
Supreme Court.74 Two of the Justices from the Mueller dissent, Justices

United States v. Chansriharaj, 446 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); United States v.
Prestigiacomo, 504 F. Supp. 681 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); United States v. Weston, 519 F. Supp.
565 (W.D.N.Y. 1981); United States v. Penosi, 548 F. Supp. 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), aftid,
United States v. Castaldi, 742 F.2d 1444 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Castaldi, 742 F.2d
1444 (2nd Cir. 1983); Nash v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 513 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 981 (1979); United States v. De La Jara, 973 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1992); Robinson v.
Borg, 918 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 868 (1991); United States v.
Fouche, 776 F.2d 1398 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1017 (1988); Smith v. Endell,
860 F.2d 1528 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981 (1990); Norman v. Ducharme, 871
F.2d 1483 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1031 (1990); United States v. Mendoza-Cecelia, 963 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 964 (1992).
68. 113 S.Ct. 1880 (1993).

69. Id.

70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. The concluding paragraph to this brief dissent read as follows: "As it is
apparent that a substantial number of criminal defendants who are identically situated in the
eyes of the Constitution have received and will continue to receive dissimilar treatment
because of the different approaches taken by the lower courts, I would grant certiorari." Id.
at 1881.
74. Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994).
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Blackmun and Souter, were finally able to address the issue on the
merits; 75 however, the majority didn't grasp the situation the way these two
Justices had hoped. The majority held ambiguous references to waiving the
right to counsel need not be clarified by interrogating officials. Justices
Blackmun and Souter, though concurring with the decision, would have
taken the holding one step further, emphasizing that interrogating officers
have a constitutional duty to ask clarifying questions before an absolute
waiver is assured.76
II. DAVIS V. UNITED STATES: CASE FACTS
Petitioner Robert L. Davis, a member of the United States Navy, spent
the night of October 2, 1988, at the Charleston Naval Base Enlisted Mens'
Club. 7 While playing pool, Davis was involved in an altercation with
another sailor, Keith Shackleford, who had lost a wager to Davis and
refused to pay. Sometime after the bar had closed, Shackleford was taken
in back of the commissary and beaten to death with a pool cue, as later
determined by Naval Investigative Service (NIS) officers.78 The body was
not found until the next day.79
After an extensive investigation by NIS agents, the list of suspects was
quickly limited to Davis. 80 On November 4, 1988, NIS agents interviewed
75. Id. at 2358-64. The lengthy concurring opinion was also joined by Justices
Stevens and Ginsburg, providing a wealth of compelling counter-arguments to Justice
O'Connor's majority opinion.
76. Id. at 2359. For other detailed accounts of the history of ambiguous waivers of
the fight to the presence of counsel prior to 1994, see Rhonda Y. Cline, Equivocal Requests
for Counsel: A Balance of Competing Policy Considerations, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 767 (1987),
and Charles R. Shreffler, Jr., Judicial Approaches to the Ambiguous Request for Counsel
Since Miranda v. Arizona, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 460 (1987). See generally Kristen. M.
Erikson, Project: Twenty-Third Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States
Supreme Court of Appeals 1992-1993 L Investigation and Police Practices, 82 GEO. L. J.
733 (March/April 1994).
77. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2353.
78. Id. at 2352-53.
79. Id. at 2353.
80. United States v. Davis, 36 M.J. 337, 337-39 (1993), affid, 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994).
Once it was determined that a pool cue was the murder weapon, NIS agents conducted
interviews with several sailors who were at the club on the night of October 3, 1988. Agents
learned that Davis was present on that night, and further that the only cues able to leave that
club were limited to those belonging to patrons who possessed their own. When this number
of patrons was found to be only three, NIS agents quickly tracked Davis. Davis was absent
from duty on the day after the murder, and the agents were able to find two pool cues owned
by Davis in his girlfriend's apartment; one of the cues had a bloodstain on it. With the
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Davis in their office. 8' Similar to the Miranda requirements, military law
requires that agents advise suspects that they are suspected in the crime, that
they are not required to make a statement, that any statement could be used
against them at a trial by court-martial, and that they are entitled to speak
with an attorney and have an attorney present during questioning. 2 NIS
agents did exactly this.8 a At the onset of the questioning, Davis waived
these rights both orally and in writing.8
Approximately an hour and a half into questioning, Davis stated,
"Maybe I should talk to a lawyer."8" NIS agents immediately ceased
interrogation, and began asking Davis clarifying questions as to whether he
wanted counsel present or not. 6 Davis replied, "No, I'm not asking for a
lawyer. No, I don't want a lawyer., 8 7 The agents took a short break,
again reminded Davis of his previously mentioned rights, and continued
questioning. 8 After another hour of interrogation, Davis stated "I think I
want a lawyer before I say anything else."89 NIS agents ceased all
questioning at that point.90 Davis later moved to suppress all statements

wealth of evidence available, NIS agents commenced interrogation procedures. Id.
81. Davis v. United States, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 2353 (1994).
82. Id.; see Art. 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 831; Mil.
Rule Evid. 305; Manual for Courts-Martial AI 1-13 (1984).
83. Davis, 114 S.Ct. at 2353.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. The exact dialogue of this transaction went as follows:
[We miade it very clear that we're not here to violate his rights, that if he
wants -a lawyer, then we will stop any kind of questioning with him, that
we weren't going to pursue the matter unless we have it clarified is he
asking for a lawyer or is he just making a comment about a lawyer, and he
said "No, I'm not asking for a lawyer," and then continued on, and said
"No, I don't want a lawyer."
Id. Do You Really Want a Lawyer?, an article by Major Matthew Winter, traced much of
the dialogue that transpired in the Davis Court. To the above dialogue, Justice Stevens in
particular expressed amazement in the fact that neither the prosecutor nor the defense counsel
at trial could elicit the exact speech communicated by interrogating officials. It appears
Justice Stevens felt this would have helped the Court decide the coerciveness of the situation;
Justice Stevens was interested in the totality of the circumstances. A skeptical Justice
Stevens questioned why the agents could remember exact dialogue from other instances of
the interview but not at this crucial point. See Winter, supra note 22, at 55.
87. Davis v. United States, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 2353 (1994).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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made at this interrogation, alleging a violation of his Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination."
At the general court-martial, the military judge denied Davis' motion
to suppress evidence. 92 The judge determined that the statement "Maybe
I should talk to a lawyer," was not a request for counsel, as properly decided
by the interrogating officers.9" Davis was convicted on one specification
of unpremeditated murder, in violation of Art. 118, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C.
Section 918, and sentenced to confinement for life, a dishonorable discharge,
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and reduction in rank to the lowest pay
grade. 94 The Navy-Marine Corps Court of Military Review affirmed.9 5
The United States Court of Military Appeals affirmed,' deciding that
the statements made by Davis were indeed ambiguous, and that the NIS
agents properly posed clarifying questions to determine exactly what Davis
wanted; the statements were legally obtained and admissible.9 7 The United
States-Supreme Court granted certiorari. 9
III. THE SUPREME COURT OPINION
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, acknowledged the two
previous opinions Smith v. Illinois" and Connecticut v. Barrett,"°° where
the respective majorities outlined the three distinct approaches lower courts
utilize in handling ambiguous or equivocal references to the right to counsel
during custodial interrogations.' 0 ' Davis, however, is the first time the
Supreme Court has addressed the issue on the merits. 2
Before directly addressing the issue at hand, the Court engaged in an
in-depth account of the history of a suspect's rights to counsel. 0 3 The
Court explained that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is effectuated
only at the start of adversarial criminal proceedings." ° Prior to such
91. Id.

92. Id. at 2350.

93. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2350.

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

102.
103.
104.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2354.
Id.
Id.
469 U.S. 91 (1984).
479 U.S. 523 (1987).
Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2354.
Id.
Id. at 2354-55.
See United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 (1984).
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proceedings, a criminal suspect has no constitutional right to the assistance
of counsel.0 5 Despite this, Miranda v. Arizona'06 held that a suspect
subject to custodial interrogation has a right to speak to an attorney and
have counsel present during questioning; further, the interrogating agent
must advise the suspect of these rights before initiating questioning.0 7
The Court recognized the importance of a suspect's right to counsel; if
a suspect waives these rights, they must do so "knowing[ly] and intelligent[ly]."' 08 Once an effective waiver is given, police are permitted to
question the suspect."° However, if the suspect requests counsel at any
point in the interrogation process, all questioning must cease until the
suspect meets with an attorney; 1 0 questioning may again resume once the
suspect reinitiates the conversation."' This rule is labeled a "second layer
of prophylaxis for the Miranda right to counsel."" 2 The Davis opinion
highlighted this importance, recognizing the second layer of prophylaxis was
105. Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2354 (1994).
106. 384 U.S. 436, 469-73 (1966).
107. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2354 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469-73). Miranda's right
to counsel was one of a "series of recommended 'procedural safeguards' . . . [that] were not
themselves rights protected by the Constitution but were instead measures to insure that the
right against compulsory self-incrimination was protected." Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S.
433, 443-44 (1974). The Davis opinion also directs the reader to U.S. CONST. amend. V:
"No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
At this point in the Davis opinion, the Court incorporated a footnote to briefly
explain why there was no need to analyze the applicability of the Fifth Amendment to
military proceedings. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2354 n.*. As the Court outlined, the President,
under authority of Art. 3636(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 836(a), prescribes procedures for
military criminal proceedings. The President has used this authority to determine that
statements taken in violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause are inadmissible in trials by
court-martial. See Mil. Rules Evid. 304(a) and (c)(3). The Court of Military Appeals has
held that the Supreme Court's cases interpreting the Fifth Amendment right to counsel are
applicable to military interrogations and the admission of evidence at trials by court-martial.
See, e.g., United States v. McLaren, 38 M.J. 112, 115 (1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1056
(1994); United States v. Applewhite, 23 M.J. 196, 198 (1987). Since the parties to the Davis
case did not object to this point, the Court assumed their precedents were applicable to the
case at hand. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2354 n.*. In the same footnote, the Court also explained
why 18 U.S.C. § 3501 is not applicable to the instant case (though later in the opinion, in
a special concurrence, Justice Scalia elaborated on exactly why he felt this statute is
absolutely crucial to this case). Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2357.
108. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2354 (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981); See
also Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1046-47 (1983) (plurality opinion)).
109. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2354 (citing North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 372-76
(1979)).
110. Id. at 2355 (citing Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 2355 (citing McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 176 (1991)).
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"designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his
previously asserted Miranda rights."" 3
In application, Edwards' rigid prophylactic rule requires courts to
resolve whether the suspect actually invoked their right to counsel; ' 4 this
16
is an objective inquiry," 5 designed to alleviate difficulties of proof."
Miranda's right to counsel necessitates, at a minimum, some statement
which can be reasonably interpreted as a request for the assistance of counsel." 7 But, some suspects give only an ambiguous or equivocal reference
to counsel, leaving the impression that they might want an attorney; 118
since it was this very discrepancy that troubled courts at all levels, the Davis
Court sought to unify the applicable law into a constitutionally feasible
precedent.
As the Court reasoned, a suspect must request counsel unambiguously:" 9 "a statement either is such an assertion of the right to counsel or it
is not. '' 0 The majority realized, as it has in the past,' 2' that the suspect

113. Id. (citing Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990)). Further, the Court
quoted Connecticut v. Barrett: "It remains clear, however, that this prohibition on further
questioning--like other aspects of Miranda--is not itself required by the Fifth Amendment's
prohibition on coerced confessions, but is instead justified only by reference to its
prophylactic purpose." Barrett, 479 U.S. at 528.
114. Davis, 114 S.Ct. at 2355 (citing Smith, 469 U.S. at 95).
115. Id. (citing Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 529 (1987)).
116. Id.
117. Id. (citing McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. at 95). As previously stated, this is an
objective inquiry, designed to settle difficulties of proof and to give interrogating officers
some form of guidance. See Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 529 (1987). "But if a
suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable
officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be
invoking the right to counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation of questioning."
Davis, 114 S.Ct. at 2355; see also McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178 (1991) (stating
that "the likelihood that a suspect would wish counsel to be present is not the test for
applicability of Edwards").
118. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2355.
119. Id.
120. Id. It is this very statement that so troubled Justices Souter, Blackmun, Stevens
and Ginsburg in their concurring opinion to Davis. The majority's assertion is taken directly
from Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 97-98 (1984) (per curiam). However, as the concurrence
elaborates, the Smith Court neither denied the possibility that a request could be ambiguous
nor did they suggest that such statements should be read independent of surrounding
circumstances. Davis, 114 S.Ct. at 2362. Though it may be fair to assume a statement is
meant either to demand counsel or not, they felt, this idea should not give police carte
blanche authority to assume that it is not a request when the police deem so necessary.
"[O]n the contrary, clarification is the intuitively sensible course." Id.
121. Davis, 114 S.Ct. at 2355.
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need not "speak with the discrimination of an Oxford don,"' 22 but they
must convey this desire for counsel clearly enough that a reasonable police
officer under those circumstances could interpret the statement as a true
request for counsel.
If this statement falls short of the requisite level
of clarity, the Court asserted, Edwards does not require the cessation of
questioning.' 24 The Davis Court refused to extend Edwards to force
police officers to cease all questioning as soon as a suspect gives ambiguous
or equivocal references to counsel."2
The remainder of the opinion attempted to rationalize this argument.
The Court understood Edwards to serve as a protection to suspects. Police
must immediately respect a suspect's desire for counsel during custodial
interrogation. 2 6 However, if the officers conducting the questioning can
not reasonably know precisely what the suspect is requesting, to require an
immediate withdrawal of questioning would "transform the Miranda
safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate police investigative
activity." '2 This is because such a rule would hinder police progress
when the suspect may not even desire counsel to be present. 28 To reinforce this idea, the Court cited Miranda language, specifically rejecting the
theory that " . . . each police station must have a 'station house lawyer'
present at all times to advise prisoners;"' 29 instead, the sole applicable
holding in Miranda requires suspects to be informed of their rights to
30
counsel, and all questioning must cease after they invoke this right.1
Further, according to the Court, Miranda supports the proposition that when

122. Id. (citing Smith, 469 U.S. at 97-98 (brackets and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
123. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2355 (citing Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2364 (Souter, J., concurring)).
124. Id. (citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 433 n.4 (1986)). Note that this line
of thinking resembles that of the second grouping of lower court approaches to ambiguous
counsel references, as outlined in Smith: "Others have attempted to define a threshold
standard of clarity for invoking the right to counsel and have held that comments falling
short of the threshold do not invoke the right to counsel." Smith, 469 U.S. at 96 n.3.
125. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2355 (citing Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 688 (1988)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting)). Justice Kennedy's dissent in the Roberson case states in part: "the
rule of Edwards is our rule, not a constitutional command; and it is our obligation to justify
its expansion." The reader is left to interpret this citing as the Davis Court's inability to

justify an Edwards expansion.
126. Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2355 (1994).

127. Id. at 2355-56 (citing Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96, 102 (1975)).

128. Id.

129. Id. at 2356 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474).

130. Id.
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suspects are indecisive in their request for counsel, police do not necessarily
need to stop questioning. 3 '
The Davis majority briefly addressed possible opposing arguments to
their rationale. They recognized that this new, more demanding rule of a
clear and unequivocal request for counsel may adversely affect those
suspects who cannot clearly invoke their right to counsel despite their true
desires, due to fear, intimidation, lack of linguistic skills, or any number of
other reasons. 132 The Court quickly dispelled these concerns by placing
a greater concentration on "the other side of the Miranda equation,"' 3 that
of the need for greater and more effective law enforcement.' 34 The
Miranda warnings themselves, the Court reasoned, are sufficient enough to
afford a primary protection to a suspect's right to counsel. 35 But the
Court believed this right must be affirmatively invoked, and in essence held
that the Edwards rule is a privilege that must be recognized and affirmatively asserted by a suspect.
Elaborating on the point of affording more effective law enforcement,
the Court stated that it is police officers who must determine whether they
can question a suspect; in this respect, the Edwards rule is a bright line rule
that can- be implicated without actually hindering the gathering of information. 136 Such clarity .and ease of application, the Court felt, would be lost
if police were required to cease questioning after an ambiguous reference to
counsel. 137 This would further cause officers to make difficult judgment
calls as to what the suspect truly wants, facing possible suppression if they
3
should guess wrong. 1
131. Id. at 2356 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 485). Nonetheless, dialogue in the Court
shows that not all the Justices were entirely closed-minded to. the idea of possible required
clarifying questions. Justice Souter directed questions to Davis' counsel as to whether a
simple question by police would solve everything, such as, "Do you want a lawyer?" The
counselor rejected this argument, stating that the very manner in which it is posed could itself
be coercive. Justice Souter continued the dialogue, and asked whether the counselor felt the
Court should try to pen some boilerplate set of clarifying questions. The counselor
responded that it would be "unrealistic" to expect the Court to devise an effective exchange
between an officer and a suspect. To this, Justice Souter grinned, and stated that the Court
was most successful in doing exactly this in Miranda. See Winter, supra note 22, at 55-56.
132. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. "[Flull comprehension of the rights to remain silent and request an attorney
[is] inherent in the interrogation process." Id. (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475. U.S. 412, 427

(1986)).

136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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Thus, Davis' ultimate holding is that after a knowing and voluntary
waiver of Miranda rights, asserted clearly and unambiguously, police
officers must cease questioning; if the suspect's request is ambiguous or
equivocal, police officers are not required to cease interrogation. 3 9 The
Court did hold, however, that interrogating agents may pose clarifying questions upon an ambiguous reference to counsel if they so desire. Such
clarifying questions are not required, however, and the admissibility of
statements will not hinge on such questions."O
In the Davis case, "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer" was found not to
be a request for counsel by the lower military court, and the Supreme Court
did not offend that decision.14 Though the agents did in fact ask further
clarifying questions, they were not required to do so. Thus, because there
was no need to cease questioning, Davis'43 statements were admissible. 42
The lower court's decision was affirmed.
Justice Scalia wrote a special concurring opinion in which he asserted
that U.S.C. § 3501, the statute governing the admissibility of confessions in
federal prosecutions, should not have been so hastily neglected.' 44 He

139. Id. The Court is "unwilling to create a third layer of prophylaxis to prevent police
questioning when the suspect might want a lawyer." Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2357 (emphasis
added).
140. Id. at 2356. The Court stated that upon an ambiguous request, it would "[o]f
course" be "good police practice" for the officers to clarify whether or not the suspect truly
wants a lawyer. Id. "Clarifying questions help protect the rights of the suspect by ensuring
that he gets an attorney if he wants one, and will minimize the chance of a confession being
suppressed due to subsequent judicial second-guessing as to the meaning of the suspect's
statement regarding counsel. But we decline to adopt a rule requiring officers to ask
clarifying questions." Id.
141. Id. at 2357. It should be noted, however, that several Justices were in fact troubled
by this decision. Justices Rehnquist, Kennedy, and Scalia posed questions to the attorneys
surrounding the plain language of the statement and whether it was in fact ambiguous.
Justice Rehnquist in particular focused on the difference between indecision as to whether
or not to invoke the right to counsel and ambiguously invoking that right. Justice Kennedy
also expressed his "surprise" at the petitioner's characterization of this sentence as
ambiguous. Perhaps the most compelling arguments at court were made by Justice Scalia,
who, as previously stated, declared "We cannot run a system for idiots." Unconvinced that
some suspects can't articulate a direct request for counsel, Justice Scalia pointed out that
Davis managed to get his point across when he later stated, "I think I want a lawyer before
I say anything else." Justice Ginsburg also mirrored these concerns. See generally Winter,
supra note 22, at 55.
142. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2357.
143. Id.
144. Id. According to Justice Scalia, "Legal analysis of the admissibility of a
confession without reference to these provisions is equivalent to legal analysis of the
admissibility of hearsay without consulting the Rules of Evidence; it is an unreal exercise."
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agreed with the majority of the Court that since the government failed to

raise the point, it is proper to proceed with a judgment without acknowledging the statute. However, he noted that it is a prudential practice only,
and in some circumstances the Court is required to review a statute despite
on it in their arguments; this case, he felt, was one
the parties' failure to rely
1 45

of those circumstances.

Justice Souter also wrote a concurring opinion, in which Justices
Blackmun, Stevens, and Ginsburg joined.'4 The Justices generally agreed
with the majority on the merits, in that once Davis gave the ambiguous
response, he soon followed it up with an affirmative waiver of counsel.'47
Thus, the statements should not have been suppressed. However, the
affirmative waiver came only after the police asked clarifying questions as
to what the suspect truly wanted; this, the concurring Justices felt, is a much
more sound practice than to allow police to disregard ambiguous references
to counsel if they so choose. 4" The concurring Justices feared that those
who clearly assert their wishes will have constitutional protection, while
those who cannot formulate a clear reference to counsel are left to fend for

Id. at 2357. Counsel for the government, at Court, was forced to answer several questions
as to how § 3501 applied to the Davis case. Though questions came from Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, and O'Connor, directed primarily at the interaction between this section and the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments, it was Justice Scalia only who wrote for the concurring opinion
on the subject. See also Winter, supra note 22, at 56.
145. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2358. "As far as I am concerned, such a time will have
arrived when a case that comes within the terms of this statute is next presented to us."
The significance of Justice Scalia's concurrence has little impact on this article, and will be
addressed accordingly. However, it should be noted that Justice Scalia evidently felt very
strongly about his objection. He stated he would be willing to accept arguments that § 3501
does not mean what it says, or that it is inapplicable for other reasons. "But I will no longer
be open to the argument that this Court should continue to ignore the commands of § 3501
simply because the Executive declines to insist that we observe them." Davis, 114 S. Ct. at
2358.
He noted that the Executive has the power of prosecutorial discretion, or the power
to nullify some aspects of law simply by not raising the issue. It also has the power to avoid
§ 3501 merely by not raising confessions admissible under its terms. But, Justice Scalia
noted, it does not have the power to determine what objections to the admissibility of the
confession are valid in law. Section 3501, he decided, cannot be overlooked "simply because
the Justice Department systematically declines to remind us of it." Id.
Among Justice Scalia's fears of this neglect is that dangerous felons continue to be
free from prosecution. The Judicial Branch, he concluded, has an obligation to decide
according to the law; neglecting § 3501 conflicts with this idea of justice. Id.
146. Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2359-64 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring).
147. Id. at 2359.
148. Id.
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themselves. 49 For these reasons, and based upon the Court's precedent,
the judgments of the majority of lower courts, and the advocacy of a
considerable body of law enforcement officials,"tS the concurring Justices
felt that upon an ambiguous reference to counsel, police should "stop their
interrogation and ask [the suspect] to make his choice clear.''.
The concurring Justices cited two precepts constituting a common
thread throughout the Court's precedent: first, Miranda safeguards exist to
protect an individual's right to choose between speech and silence throughout the interrogation process, 52 and second, the justifications for Miranda
safeguards must be consistent with practical realities. 53 A rule requiring
officers' clarification of exactly what the suspect wants, the Justices felt, will
satisfy both of these concerns."
Justice Souter and the rest of the
concurring Justices were confident that future courts will use the majority's
decision sensibly, and not require suspects to speak with the discrimination
of an Oxford don.155 They also felt interrogators will follow "good police
practice," because there is no other option. 5 6
IV. ANALYSIS
...If a lawyer is seen as a nettlesome obstacle to the pursuit of
wrongdoers-as in an inquisitorial society-then the Court's decision
today makes a good deal of sense. If a lawyer is seen as an aid
to the understanding and protection of constitutional rights-as in
an accusatorial society-then today's decision makes no sense at
157
all.
5
This quote, found in Justice Stevens' dissent in Moran v. Burbine,'
emphasizes what seems to be the starting block for how to analyze ambiguous waivers of the right to counsel. 59 The Davis decision requires

149. Id.
150. The concurring opinion cites a great number of cases and other authorities that
support this statement. See generally Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2359 n.2 (Souter, J., concurring).
151. Id.at 2359.
152. Id.at 2359-60 (citing Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528 (1987) (quoting
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469 (1966) and supplying emphasis)).
153. Id. at 2360 (citing Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 688 (1988) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting)).
154. Id. at 2360 (Souter, J.,
concurring).
155. Id. at 2364.
156. Id. at 2364.
157. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 468 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
158. Id.
159. In McNeil v. Wisconsin, where this quote was again used, the United States
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suspects to clearly and unambiguously assert their right to speak with
counsel; if they do not, then police are not required to further clarify exactly
what the suspect desired. The decision would appear, on its face, to be
essentially a response to the majority's fear of a suspect seeking the guidance of counsel; the fear is due in part to a fear that conviction will be less
likely absent a confession.
Though law enforcement advocates are likely to favor this new
approach, other authorities are not as likely to admire its practicality.
For
6
example, as Justice Goldberg stated in Escobedo v. Illinois:' 0
We have also learned the companion lesson of history that no
system of criminal justice can, or should, survive if it comes to
depend for its continued effectiveness on the citizens' abdication
through unawareness of their constitutional rights. No system
worth preserving should have to fear that if an accused is
permitted to consult with a lawyer, he will become aware of, and
exercise, these rights. If the exercise of constitutional rights will
thwart the effectiveness of a system of law enforcement, then
6
there is something very wrong with that system.1 1
This value to a suspect of his right to consult with counsel has been
properly recognized by the Court in the past. In United States v. Gouveia,162 Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Brennan joined, elaborately explained why attorneys are so crucial to the judicial process. 163 As their
dissent explains, once a person is taken into custody for the purpose of
interrogation, Escobedo and Mirandasupport the proposition that the person
immediately becomes the "accused."'" It is at this point that the
suspect,
65
intimidated and confused, most needs the assistance of counsel.
Supreme Court held that requests for counsel are offense-specific; if a suspect requests an
attorney for one offense, this does not mean he requests one for any subsequent different
charges. Justice Stevens feared that this decision dimmed the bright line rule of Edwards.
McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 189 (1991).
160. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
161. Id. at 490.

162. 467 U.S. 180 (1984).

163. Id. at 194-95 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 197.
165. Id. Justice Stevens went on to quote specific language from Escobedo:
. ."any
"
lawyer worth his weight in salt will tell the suspect in no
uncertain terms to make no statement to police under any circumstances."
The fact that many confessions are obtained during this period points up its
critical nature as a "stage when legal aid and advice" are surely needed.
The right to counsel would indeed be hollow if it began at a period when
few confessions were obtained. There is necessarily a direct relationship
between the importance of a stage to the police in their quest for a
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These thoughts would seem entirely prudent and essential to any
analysis of an ambiguous waiver question. In fact, the Davis decision did
recognize categories of suspects for which this may hold true; however, the
Court's hasty identification of the problem undermines the true importance
In one brief
of the assistance of counsel in a criminal interrogation."
of the right
assertions
clear
requiring
that
paragraph, the majority recognized
to counsel "might disadvantage some suspects who--because of fear,
intimidation, lack of linguistic skills, or a variety of other reasons--will not
clearly articulate their right to counsel although they actually want to have
a lawyer present."' 6 7 However, the Court quashed this crucial point as
quickly as it raised it. The Davis majority held that the Miranda warnings,
in and of themselves, are sufficient to provide suspects with the protection
of the Fifth Amendment.'68 This flawed logic is entirely impractical, and
does not seem to justify protection of the confused and intimidated class of
individuals previously mentioned.
As the Davis Court acknowledged, the Miranda rights are a primary
protection to suspects subjected to an adversarial, criminal interrogation.
Edwards v. Arizona provides a second layer of prophylaxis to this protection, by requiring the cessation of questioning upon a suspect's expressed
desire to speak with counsel; interrogation may not resume until such a
meeting has occurred. The issue in the Davis case, as the Court viewed it,
is whether to add a third layer of prophylaxis to the regiment, that of
requiring clarifying questioning upon an ambiguous or equivocal reference
to the right to counsel; the Court declined the opportunity to address this
issue. By implication, the Court has answered an important underlying
question: how much protection is too much protection for suspects? Or,
more generally, how much protection should suspects receive and how much
should police receive? At this point in history, at least, the Court seems to

confession and the criticalness of that stage to the accused in his need for
legal advice. Our Constitution, unlike some others, strikes the balance in
favor of the right of the accused to be advised by his lawyer of his
privilege against self-incrimination.
Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 194 n.2 (quoting Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 488).
Note also that Justice Stevens, who later joined in Justice Souter's concurrence in
Davis, there agreed that police must pose clarifying questions to suspects' ambiguous
waivers, thus continuing his stance as a leading Justice in carefully protecting the right to
counsel.
166. Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2356 (1994).
167. Id.
168. Id. (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 476 U.S. at 427) (stating that "full comprehension
of the rights to remain silent and request an attorney [is] sufficient to dispel whatever
coercion is inherent in the interrogation process").
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be saying that suspects have the right to request the assistance of counsel
during interrogation, but they will be instructed as such only once. Thus,
though the Court still recognizes the importance of the right to counsel via
the Miranda rights, the rights in and of themselves should be sufficient
enough to inform a suspect without further clarification; the Mirandas given
once are an effective technique to duly protect suspects and police alike.
This is a profound conclusion not as readily accepted by all members
of the legal community. Consider, for example, Marvin Frankel's position
in his article From Private Fights to Public Justice:'69 "[n]obody, 'liberal'
or 'conservative,' is happy with Miranda. Nobody should be. It is at best
a tense, temporary, ragged truce between combatants."' 7 As he elaborates, both sides feel handcuffed; the prosecution cannot get a confession
without a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of the rights, and
defense attorneys are displeased with the number of alleged voluntary
confessions. As Frankel further states:
There are divergences of sorts in the lower courts, but the net
effects of Mirandaamounts to a rule that if an arrestee is of sound
mind, is warned of his rights, understands the language, and then
confesses, he will be found to have made a "knowing, intelligent
and voluntary" waiver. By such reasoning, multitudes of waivers
are found to have occurred each year, despite the fact that any
person who knows what he is doing ought to volunteer noth1
ing.'

7

In Questioning Miranda,' Gerald Caplan calls the Miranda decision
an "exaggerated response to the times," and further that it suggested criminals were not "wicked" but rather "unfortunate." H. Richard Uviller adds
that the Miranda routine "seriously impugns the integrity of its premises: if
a confession given in police custody is necessarily coerced, so is a waiver
...the famous warning adds little to the suspect's protection.""'
One author would revise the existing Miranda decision, so as to
"'Mirandize' Miranda." Charles Ogletree, in his article Are Confessions
Really Good for the Soul? A Proposal to Mirandize Miranda,'74 writes the
following:

169. Marvin Frankel, From Private Fights to Public Justice, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 516
(1976).
170. Id. at 526.
171. Id.
172. Gerald Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417, 1457-58 (1985).
173. H. RICHARD UVILLER, TEMPERED ZEAL 194-96 (1988) (citation omitted).
174. Charles Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul? A Proposal to
Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1826 (1987).

19951

DAVIS V. UNITED STATES

All suspects in custody should have a nonwaivable right to consult
with a lawyer before being interrogated by the police.... [This]
proposal would provide clear guidance both to the police for
handling suspects after arrest and to the lower courts for expediting the time-consuming appellate review of Mirandaissues. If the
Court adopted a per se rule that rendered any waiver given in the
absence of counsel invalid and excluded any statements so
obtained, the police would have little incentive for using either
physical or psychological coercion to obtain incriminating
evidence from suspects.'7 3
Still others feel that Miranda has done exactly what it set out 1 to
76
accomplish. Stephen Schulhofer, in his article Reconsidering Miranda,
feels Miranda has drawn unwarranted criticism:
The notion that police-initiated warnings can "dispel" the compulsion seems dubious at best. But whether or not they went far
enough, Miranda's warnings unquestionably serve--and from the
outset were designed to serve--the function of permitting custodial
interrogation to continue. Indeed, the Court would have incurred
far more police criticism if it had remained within a narrow
conception of the judicial role, pronounced interrogation "inherently compelling," and then left law enforcement officials to guess
about what countermeasures would keep police on the safe of the
constitutional line.'7

Unquestionably, a wealth of conflicting opinions exist as to the
effectiveness of Miranda, and it is doubtful that a universal consensus will
ever evolve. Nonetheless, the Davis Court, at least at this point in history,
has assumed that reading Miranda rights is an effective tool for informing
suspects of their constitutional rights. This article makes no judgments on
the success of the Mirandas themselves; instead, this article addresses the
Court's denial of devising a third layer of prophylaxis protecting ambiguous
waivers of the right to counsel.
As stated previously, an underlying question that exists in this inquiry
is where the balance of protection is to rest: with the police, or with the

175. Id. at 1842-44.
176. Stephen Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 436 (1987).
177. Id. Schulhofer outlines three essential steps that mark the Miranda decision. First,

that the Court held pressure to speak unbacked by legal process can constitute "compulsion"
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Second, this informal compulsion is evident

in any questioning of a suspect in custody. Third, the precisely specified warnings are
necessary to dispel this compelling pressure. It is this third step, Schulhofer feels, that has
drawn the most misplaced criticism. Id.
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suspect. Had the Davis Court allowed this third layer of prophylaxis, then
suspects would undoubtedly receive additional protection, outweighing
police interests in their own protection. As the decision stands, however, the
interrogating officials have received this additional protection; they no
longer must clarify ambiguous references to counsel. An effective balance
would seem to have been struck; suspects receive protection through the
Mirandas (assuming they are effective to begin with), and police are
protected from being forced to essentially compel a suspect to invoke their
right to counsel. As Justice Scalia himself stated during the Davis hearing,
"We cannot run a system for idiots," assuming that only idiots are unable
to answer 'yes' or 'no' to the question "Would you like to have an attorney
present?" Yet, upon careful consideration, this "balance" does not seem so
equal, and requiring clarifying questioning may be the only constitutional
solution.
Several facets of the Davis majority's logic seem to deprive suspects
of constitutional justice. For example, the Court determines the applicable
standard as:
some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an
expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney ...[b]ut
if a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or
equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances
would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking
the right to counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation of
questioning.'78
As support for this proposition, the Court cites McNeil v. Wisconsin, 179
which stated "the likelihood that a suspect would wish counsel to be present
is not the test for applicability of Edwards."'10 No doubt a statement that
leaves any sort of question in the mind of an officer as to a suspect's desire
for counsel is one which requires much greater consideration than the Davis
Court affords. A suspect is presumed innocent until proven guilty; by
ignoring an ambiguous reference to counsel, officers are denying suspects
this valuable presumption, since the underlying hope is that the suspect will
confess without the intermeddling of counsel. If an officer has even a doubt
that the suspect may be invoking their right, common sense dictates
dispelling the doubt one way or the other via clarifying questions. Justice
Souter's concurring opinion elaborated on the feared, foreseeable result of
bypassing equivocal waivers of counsel:

178. Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2355 (1944).
179. 501 U.S. 171 (1991).
180. Id. at 178.
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When a suspect understands his (expressed) wishes to have been
ignored (and by hypothesis, he has said something that an
objective listener could "reasonably," although not necessarily,
take to be a request), in contravention of the "rights" just read to
him by his interrogator, he may well see further objection as futile
(true or not) as the only way to end his interrogaand confession
s
tion.1 1
If a suspect does in fact give an equivocal or ambiguous waiver of
counsel, it should be apparent that they truly are confused and intimidated;
verbally bludgeoning a confession from such a suspect is arguably not the
sort of justice Miranda and its progeny sought to evince. In fact, it is quite
conceivable that not clarifying ambiguous questions may in fact have the
opposite effect of what interrogating officials hope for. In the Davis fact
'18 2
pattern, the suspect had stated "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer," then
when questioning continued for another hour and a half, Davis clearly stated
8 3 There, Davis had
"I think I want a lawyer before I say anything else."'
already given incriminating statements; however, in another scenario where
the suspect has not yet given a confession, and authorities ignore any
ambiguous waivers (given out of confusion), persistent questioning may
cause a suspect to affirmatively invoke the right out of aggravation when
they may have otherwise given a complete confession. When such coercion
is considered, perhaps Justice Scalia's dismay as to Davis' ability to
"somehow" clearly demand counsel later in the interview is ill-founded.'"
The idea that an interrogation environment is inherently coercive and
As Justice
intimidating has gained almost universal acceptance. 185
Souter's concurring opinion points out, "a once-stated warning, delivered by
those who will conduct the interrogation cannot itself suffice to assure that
the . . . right to choose between silence and speech remains unfettered

Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2362 (Souter, J.concurring).
Id. at 2350.
Id. at 2353.
See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
One author had the following to say:
To me, the resolution of the Miranda case seriously impugns the integrity of its
premises: if a confession given in police custody is necessarily coerced, so is a
waiver. I heartily appreciate the Court's reluctance to outlaw all confessions by
suspects in custody; the cost to law enforcement would be far too great. But if
noncoercive custodial interrogation is to be permitted (as it is), the famous warning
adds little to the suspect's protection. Those suspects actually intimidated by the
circumstances of custody are hardly reassured by hearing the ritual incantation from
their inquisitors.
H. RICHARD UVILLER, TEMPERED ZEAL 194-96 (1988).
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
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throughout the interrogation process."'" Recognizing this simple concept,
the Court has previously had the following to say:
Beyond [the] duty to inform, Miranda requires that the police
respect the [suspect's] decision to exercise the rights outlined in
the warnings. "If the individual indicates in any manner, at any
time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain
silent, or [if he] states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation
87
must cease.",1
Further, exact language from Miranda itself indicates that the purpose
of the warnings is to "show the individual that his interrogators are prepared
to recognize his privilege should he choose to exercise it."'8 8 Yet, the
Davis majority has held that any request that cannot reasonably be
understood to be a request for counsel should in effect be ignored. The concept flies in the face of Moran's "indicates in any manner" language, as well
as Miranda's stated purpose of showing that interrogators are "prepared to
recognize [the] privilege."'8 9
Most surprisingly, however, is the fact that the Davis majority, which
relies so heavily on Miranda language to support its holding, fails to
emphasize perhaps the most significant language of Miranda. Miranda held
that a suspect must give a "knowing and intelligent waiver" of the right to
counsel.' 9
Though the Davis majority briefly mentioned this vital
language, they failed to effectively analyze what this language actually
entails. It is difficult to imagine that a suspect who cannot clearly assert
their right to counsel in clear terms, such that any reasonable police officer
can understand the statement to be a request for counsel, is truly giving a
"knowing and intelligent waiver." Yet, the Davis decision invites interrogating officers to essentially disregard ambiguous references to counsel as the
equivalent of a knowing and intelligent waiver. To do otherwise, as Justice
Scalia so hastily determined at Court, would be to tailor fit the law to
protect a suspect from their own inarticulateness: "We cannot run a system
for idiots."' 9'
Does clarifying a suspect's reference to counsel, spoken in a foreign
language, constitute "run[ning] a system for idiots"? Consider United States
186. Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2361-62 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring)

(citations
187.
473-74).
188.
189.
190.
191.

omitted).
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 420 (1986) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468.
Id.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469-73.
See Winter, supra note 22, at 55.
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92 A Peruvian individual, who was a suspect and ultimatev. De La Jara.1
93 De La
ly the accused in a money laundering case, spoke only Spanish.
Jara's statement, "debo yo Ilamar a mi abodado" could be interpreted three
9
different ways, depending upon voice inflection and intonation." As the
court understood it, if the statements would have been interpreted as "Can
I call my attorney?" or "I should call my lawyer," then the statements could
95
have been interpreted as clear invocations of the right to counsel.'
However, a third interpretation could have been "Should I call my
attorney?", and this, the court held, may not have been even an equivocal
invocation, let alone a clear request.' 96 The court ultimately held this to
be a request for counsel, nullifying all incriminating statements made
thereafter.' 97 But, according to the new Davis decision, since three
interpretations existed, this statement conceivably could have been found to
be an ambiguous reference to counsel, and thus the statements may not have
been suppressed. In short, a diametrically opposed result may have ensued
applying the Davis holding, based on nothing more than one interpreter's
understanding of one statement.
The De La Jara decision points to an even more important inconsistency that must soon be attacked. That decision illustrates the important and
obvious problem that a suspect's statement cannot simply be dissected from
his entire interrogation session and put under scrutiny by itself at trial in
determining whether it is ambiguous or not. There, for example, the
statement in and of itself can be interpreted three different ways, depending
upon voice intonation and inflection. But, if the entire session were taken
into account, including the other statements made by De La Jara, his facial
and other physical gestures (which may convey confusion, fear, and

192. 973 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1992).
193. Id. at 750.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. See also United States v. Hernandez, 913 F.2d 1506, 1510 (10th Cir. 1990)
(holding a waiver valid when defendant was advised of rights in native tongue even though
translation not perfect and given by passenger in car the suspect was driving), cert. denied,
499 U.S. 908 (1991); United States v. Boon San Chong, 829 F.2d 1572, 1574-75 (11 th Cir.
1987) (holding a waiver valid despite Chinese defendant's lack of fluency in English when
advised of rights in English and Chinese and stated that he understood his rights); Perri v.
Director, Dep't of Corrections, 817 F.2d 448, 452 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 843
(1987) (holding a waiver valid even though warnings were read in a different dialect of
Italian, and defendant responded in English that he comprehended the warnings); United
States v. Short, 790 F.2d 464, 469 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding waiver invalid when West
German defendant received Miranda warnings not translated into German).
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frustration), and the possible intimidating voices and tactics of the police,' 98 then perhaps the statement may not have seemed so equivocal, but
actually a clear and definite request to speak with an attorney., 99 The
Davis Court makes no reference to such external evidence, and probably
would not have analyzed extrinsic evidence had they decided the De La
Jara case. 2"
Does posing clarifying questioning to an obviously confused suspect
who states "Yeah and no, uh, I don't know what's what, really,, 2 0t amount
to "runtning] a system for idiots?" This quote would seem to have come
from precisely the "idiot" that Justice Scalia scorned. This ambiguous
statement was a suspect's response to the police question "Do you wish to
talk to me at this time without a lawyer being present?" in Smith v.

198. Justice Souter's concurring opinion in Davis had the following to say about
"difficult judgment calls" in determining requests for counsel under coercion:
As a practical matter, of course, the primary arbiters of "clarity" will be the
interrogators themselves, who tend as well to be courts' preferred source
in determining the precise words a suspect used. And when an inculpator
statement has been obtained as a result of an unrecorded, incommunicado
interrogation, these officers rarely lose "swearing matches" against criminal
defendants at suppression hearings.
Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2363 n.7 (Souter, J., concurring).
199. At least one author opts for what he feels is the ultimate eliminator of doubt: "the
Miranda system of police-issued warnings would be a much more formidable safeguard--if,
whenever feasible, an electronic recording of the entire waiver transaction had to be made."
Yale Kamisar, Edward L. Barrett, Jr.: The Critic with 'That Quality of Judiciousness
Demanded of the Court Itself, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 191, 210-11 (1987). Though this is
certainly an intriguing idea, perhaps a video recording of the entire transaction would better
serve his wish than an audio recorder, since, as noted above, facial and other physical
gestures can certainly come into play.
200. But see United States v. Cheeley, 36 F.3d 1439 (9th Cir. 1994). Cheeley, while
in prison for a prior offense, directed relatives outside of the prison on how to build a mail
bomb, to be sent to the witness who testified against him. Id. at 1441. When police came
to his cell to question him as to the bomb, Cheeley replied that he had expected them, and
that his attorney did not want him to sign anything. Id. at 1446. A confession was soon
given nonetheless. Id. Cheeley's statement, that his lawyer said not to speak with the
inspectors, "does not necessarily invoke his rights to simply by saying the magic word
'attorney."' Id. at 1447. However, the court did in fact combine several factors to determine
Cheeley had not waived his rights. Id. at 1448. His written acknowledgement that he
understood his rights, his refusal to sign a written waiver, and his statement about his
attorney's instructions were factors considered in holding that Cheeley had invoked his fight
to counsel in accordance with Edwards v. Arizona. Id. Perhaps courts are indeed moving
toward looking to the totality of the circumstances, rather than merely dissecting the given
statement under scrutiny.
201. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 93 (1984).
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Illinois.2" This, undoubtedly, is the most obvious of examples of a truly
ambiguous reference to whether a suspect desires counsel. According to the
Davis decision, such an ambiguity would not need to be clarified by police,
and it would be as good as a clear waiver. It is difficult to imagine a Court
that could equate this statement to a "knowing and intelligent waiver" of
counsel as required by Miranda, which is what the Davis decision stands
for. These results are precisely why the Davis holding, in practicality, can
never suffice to achieve the well-established goals of the judiciary to
promote justice. Such confusion need be disposed of in the mind of the
suspect if their rights are to be worth their weight in salt, especially when
considering that police are to give the impression that they are there to
protect a suspect's rights. Even if the Smith suspect is precisely the sort of
"idiot" Justice Scalia was referring to, the burden of clarifying what he
wanted and relieving him of "idiot" status is much less than the burden of
allowing him to remain an "idiot," which would allow injustice to persevere.
Instead, the Davis majority was more concerned with the "other side of
20 3
the Miranda equation, that of the need for effective law enforcement.
The Edwards rule is a bright line one, they held, and it does not need
another layer of prophylaxis. And, admittedly, the need for effective and
efficient law enforcement is certainly a crucial one, not to be undermined.
Yet, is the goal of more effective law enforcement truly reached if such
injustice is forced on suspects' legal rights to counsel? A genuine fear that
should be present with such a decision is that this new rule is actually going
to provide for even more ambiguity and greater confusion. Now, courts
must determine if the interrogating officers made the correct decision in
labeling a request ambiguous. In short, the Court still has not clarified what
an ambiguous reference to counsel actually is. More importantly, though,
is the fact that all suspects, regardless of their status and ability to clearly
assert their rights, must now not only realize they have the right to counsel,
but also invoke their rights in no uncertain terms, with their protection
possibly being lost otherwise. Rather than place the greater burden on
police officers, who are already well versed in the law, the Court has
misplaced this great burden on the ignorant suspect, who is potentially
suffering from "fear, intimidation, lack of linguistic skills, or a variety of
other reasons." 2°

202. Id. Recall thai this case outlined what lower court trends existed in dealing with
ambiguous waivers. See supra notes 55, 57-58 and accompanying text.
203. Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2356 (1994).
204. Id.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

V. THE DAVIS IMPACT

This paper has focused primarily on the immediate effects of Davis'
impact. However, the long term effects are equally as traceable. Where the
decision was intended to guide police through interrogation, by establishing
a "definitive" point where questioning must cease, Davis has instead left
three distinct trends in the lower courts. First is the line of decisions that
have adhered to Davis, finding equivocal waivers of counsel not meriting
further analysis. The second noticeable trend is for courts to apply the
Davis rationale, not to equivocal waivers of suspects' right to counsel, but
rather to suspects' rights to remain silent. The third trend, and perhaps the
most intriguing of the three, is for lower courts to circumvent the United
States Supreme Court and apply either their own state's constitution or case
law. This last trend results in greater protection to the criminal suspect.
The fact that three trends do exist is evidence that Davis has not been as
successful as anticipated.
The first of these trends manifests itself in a number of lower court
decisions resolved since the Davis decision.2 5 Strictly following the
Davis rationale, these decisions would seem to be in full compliance with
the holding. Once again, Davis held merely that upon an ambiguous waiver
of one's right to the presence of counsel at interrogation, police questioning
is not required to cease; it may, and clarifying questions may be posed, but
this need not be the case. Equivocal responses, according to the Court, are
those where a police officer could not reasonably infer an invocation of the
right. What's interesting about the first noted lower court trend is that to
date,2° in each reported case where the question is raised, not one court
has found a potentially equivocal waiver to in fact be anything but an
207Tnsot
In short, what seems to be happening is that the
equivocal waiver.
evidence is being weighed in police favor against suspects' rights, effectively making the Davis decision a scapegoat for deeper analysis.
An example is United States v. Menzer,2° 8 a case decided approxiWhile in prison for a previously
mately one month after Davis.2°
committed crime, defendant Menzer confided in a fellow inmate that he had
additionally committed the crime of arson, resulting in the death of two of
205. See, e.g., Gresham v. United States, 654 A.2d 871 (D.C.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
155 (1995); State v. Eastlack, 883 P.2d 999 (Ariz. 1994); State v. Long, 526 N.W.2d 826
(Wis. Ct. App. 1994); Gentry v. State, 1994 WL 529410 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994).
206. This paper covers cases decided and reported on or before January 1, 1996.
207. Id.
208. 29 F.3d 1223 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 515 (1994).
209. The case was decided on July 21, 1994; Davis was decided on June 24, 1994.
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his sons.21 ° When that fellow inmate relayed the confession to prison officials, formal charges were brought against Menzer for this second offense,
which resulted in a conviction in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin."' On appeal, Menzer challenged whether
his statements made in prison for the prior offenses violated
his constitution12
offense.'
new
the
of
him
convict
to
used
when
al rights
The Seventh Circuit chose to concentrate their holding more on the
question of whether Menzer was "in custody," and held that incarceration
per se does not necessarily result in custody; thus, the officers' interview of
the imprisoned Menzer did not violate his constitutional right to be free
from self-incrimination.2" 3 However, in a brief footnote following this
lengthy discussion, the court did address Menzer's statement "Maybe I
should speak with a lawyer," spoken to the law enforcement officials in the
course of questioning." 4 The issue was dropped as quickly as it was
raised when the court recognized that Davis held this exact statement not to
be a request for counsel. 2 5 Nothing more was stated in reference to
Davis. What the Seventh Circuit had done, in effect, is to use the Davis
opinion as a scapegoat for deeper issues, merely because the language used
by Menzer mirrored that of Davis."6 The Menzer decision should echo
the concern expressed earlier, that a statement cannot be successfully
dissected from the overall tone of the interrogation in determining whether
an effective waiver of counsel exists. Yet, the Menzer court refused to
address Davis' issue of practicality, since the court held that this was not a

210. At the time, Menzer was in prison for the sexual exploitation of his three boys.
Menzer, 29 F.3d at 1225. Menzer, his wife, and his three boys lived in Onion River Mill,
which had recently burned down as the result of arson. Two of Menzer's three boys perished
in the fire. After Menzer's confession to the fellow inmate was discovered, officials
suspected that Menzer executed the arson as a result of his wife's threats to expose his sexual
misconduct to police.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1226. This was only one of five issues on appeal; for purposes of this paper,
however, only the suppression issue is relevant.
213. United States v. Menzer, 29 F.3d 1223, 1232-33 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
515 (1994).
214. Id. at 1233 n.10.
215. Id. The court quoted exact Davis language: "Unless a suspect actually requests an
attorney, questioning may continue." Id.
216. Certainly, this is the goal of Court precedent (that is, being able to rely on
precedent to save unnecessary duplicate analysis). However, deeper analysis needs to be
done, and the Menzer court, like many other courts, almost acknowledges that they are not
scrutinizing the issue as much as they need to.
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custodial interrogation, and thus did not require Menzer's right to counsel
to be recognized."
Menzer is by no means the sole example. A list can be compiled
showing statements held ambiguous or equivocal by various courts, thus not
requiring police to cease their questioning. In State v. Long,218 for
example, a defendant arrested for one count of first-degree sexual assault of
a child and one count of second-degree sexual assault of a child, while in
interrogation, stated "My attorney told me I shouldn't talk unless he is
here. 2 9 There, the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin held that this statement was merely an indication of what the defendant's attorney told him not
to do; he was not affirmatively invoking his right to counsel's presence.22
In Gresham v. United States, 221 the defendant, charged with various counts
of murder and armed robbery, while being escorted into the interrogation
room was able to shout to his girlfriend to call his mother and have her get
him a lawyer.222 Since the words were not spoken directly to police, even
though in their presence, the statement was equivocal at best, and police
were not required to infer an invocation from that statement.223 Yet
another example is the Eastlack decision, where the statement "I think I
better talk to a lawyer first" was not a clear request for counsel. 24
What these decisions are pointing to is that a suspect must truly in no
equivocal terms state "I want my lawyer now." If the suspect even hints at
the fact that he is not sure, he will lose his right to counsel's presence. This
certainly was not the result contemplated by Mirandaand its progeny. How
can a knowing and intelligent waiver be summarily assumed when it is
painfully obvious that the suspect isn't sure what to do? This first noted
trend among courts is weighing the evidence in a light most favorable to
police, and essentially placing the burden of proof on the suspect to show
that he intended to invoke his right to the presence of counsel. Again, as
of yet a suspect has not been able to meet this burden. What seems to be
happening here is that courts are taking an even tougher stance on crime by
allowing suspects less benefit of the doubt in their requests, and giving the
police greater benefit of the doubt in accepting these questionably-obtained
confessions. It is difficult to imagine a rational, non-biased listener who

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Menzer, 29 F.3d at 1232-33.
526 N.W.2d 826 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 830.
Id.
654 A.2d 871 (D.C. 1995).
Id. at 873.
Id. at 874.
See supra notes 1-15, 22-26 and accompanying text.
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could honestly claim that the statements "My attorney told me I shouldn't
'
talk unless he is here,"2" and "I think I better talk to a lawyer first"226
are not definitive statements showing a desire for counsel's presence.
The second trend, as alluded to earlier, is for lower courts to apply
Davis as written and expand that decision as precedent for cases involving
a suspect's desire to remain silent, an entirely distinct right from that of the
presence of counsel at interrogation, as Davis had contemplated. A prime
example of this hybrid, and the first court to in fact apply it, is Coleman v.
Singletary.227 Coleman, age 15, was convicted of second-degree murder
of his ten-year-old sister.22' After voluntarily phoning a suicide counseling center and confessing to the offense, Coleman was taken into custody
and questioned by two detectives. 229 The boy was informed of his
Miranda rights several times, which were waived by him on each occasion. 2 ' The entire dialogue was being taped by the detectives when a
public defender called and instructed the detectives to cease all interviewing
immediately; the detectives stopped taping the session at that time. 231 The
prosecutor informed this public defender that she could not speak with the
boy unless in person; she never came, and Coleman was never informed that
she intended to instruct him not to answer any more questions.232 Questioning resumed; when asked if he wanted to speak with the interrogating
officers, the boy replied "I don't know, but if he said to stop it I don't want
to do what he said not to do. 233 The boy proceeded to confess to the murder.23

225. Long, 526 N.W.2d at 830.
226. State v. Eastlack, 883 P.2d 999, 1005 (Ariz. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1978
(1995).
227. 30 F.3d 1420 (11 th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1801 (1995). The case was
decided on September 8, 1994.
228. Id. at 1422. Coleman strangled his sister with a knotted belt when she wouldn't
leave the house to allow Coleman to kill his father.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Coleman, 30 F.3d at 1422. The public defender was made aware of Coleman's
arrest by the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. Her request of the
detectives to "cease any further interview at this time" was relayed to Coleman as well. Id.
232. Id. at 1422.
233. Id. at 1422-23. When asked by the detectives if his confession was of his own free
will, Coleman inquired about the public defender's call. A portion of the conversation went
as follows:
Detective: "Okay, Tony, do -you feel that you want to have a public
defender?"
Coleman: "I don't know. But if he said to stop it I don't want to do what
he said not to do."
Detective: "All right. Well, do you have any objections to talking to us?
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On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit began its analysis by outlining their
prior handling of equivocal requests for counsel.235 The Eleventh Circuit's
approach, as stated by the court, has historically been to limit all police
interrogation to clarifying questions after an equivocal waiver of one's right
to counsel.236 In the wake of the recent Davis decision, however, this
court was forced to adopt this new Davis standard allowing questioning to
continue upon an ambiguous reference toward counsel.237 The Eleventh
Circuit expanded this decision even further, though; the Davis standard,
dealing with ambiguous references to counsel, is to be equally applied to a
suspect's ambiguous or equivocal references to the right to terminate
questioning.23 Weighing all the evidence in this particular case, the court

Id.

It's up to you. Now, again, you know what our job is. We need to know
what happened, and that's basically it. But we don't want to do anything,
we don't want to force you to do anything that you don't want to do. If
you want to talk to [us], fine, we'll continue with the conversation. You
can stop any time you want to stop. You can ask us any questions, but it's
up to you. If you want to talk to us, we'll listen. If you want us to stop
asking you any questions, we'll do that."
Coleman: "I guess if that guy thinks it's all right, I don't care."

While the transcript of the foregoing interrogation does not allow for an analysis of
the intonation, inflection, and spacing of the conversation, it is nonetheless easy to see how
the officers' questioning techniques could prove somewhat coercive. This is especially
apparent upon considering the suspect's age; the boy was a mere 15-year-old. Any 15-yearold boy forced into a police interrogation setting irrespective of how hardened he is, will
surely feel some degree of overwhelming intimidation, just by the very nature of the setting.
A great deal of confusion is likely to ensue. Here, the detective's rapid fire barrage of
statements to the young boy did not aid his confusion. It is likely that Coleman's decision
to talk was given merely to end the detective's talking.
Further, it is evident that the boy did not know exactly what had transpired between
the public defender and the detective. By referring to the defender as "he," Coleman was
obviously unaware she was a female, let alone that she wanted him to remain silent. Upon
balancing the detective's interest in obtaining a confession with Coleman's right (and
knowledge of that right) to speak with his attorney, one who in fact unsuccessfully attempted
to meet with him, one is left to wonder whether the police interest is outweighed and the
boys rights violated.
234. Id. at 1423.
235. Id. at 1423-24.
236. Id. (citing Owen v. Alabama, 849 F.2d 536, 539 (11th Cir. 1988)). This, recall,
is the most often used third approach outlined in Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91 (1984). For
a review of the Smith approach, see supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
237. "However, our prior decisions must yield to supervening decisions of the Supreme
Court.... Because we are bound to the Supreme Court's holding in Davis, our decisions
creating a duty to clarify a suspect's intent upon an equivocal invocation of counsel are no
longer good law." Coleman, 30 F.3d at 1424.
238. The Court cites as authority Martin v. Wainright, 770 F.2d 918, 924 (l1th Cir.
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held that because Coleman did not know that the public defender was trying
to tell him to remain silent, 239 his statement was in fact an equivocal
request to cease questioning.2' Thus, based on the Davis decision, the
court held the confession admissible, since the detectives were not required
by Davis to cease or clarify questioning. It is important to note, though,
that the court limited its holding to the specific facts of this case, "under
which a reasonable officer could interpret the suspect's words to mean that,
as [Coleman]
said, [Coleman] did not know whether he wanted to stop
241
talking.
The Coleman decision is frightening on several counts, not the least of
which is the Eleventh Circuit's apparent misunderstanding and unacceptable
expansion of the Davis holding. Davis attempted to remedy situations
where a suspect does not clearly decide, when asked, whether they want an
attorney present during interrogation. The Coleman court has surprisingly
extended this decision to include a suspect's right to remain silent as well.
However, the right to terminate questioning, or remain silent, is not the
equivalent of a suspect's right to the presence of counsel at interrogation.
One can certainly choose to remain silent without desiring counsel, and the
two requests are formulated distinctively as well.
This Coleman expansion is all the more surprising upon scrutinizing the
facts of this case. Coleman had counsel readily available to him, seeking
him out, in fact. The boy was aware of this. Yet, the police interfered with
the boy's right to speak with that public defender, then further advanced his
confusion by concealing what she had said. This act shows that the police
were fearful of a stifled confession had the boy met with the public defender. Nonetheless, the Eleventh Circuit held that the boy's ignorance of the
defender's quashed advice was evidence of an equivocal waiver of his fight
to counsel.242 In other words, the court may have been implying that had
the boy known of the attorney's wishes, then given the exact same
statements toward counsel, perhaps his request would then become an
affirmative one. This of course was impossible once the police interfered
with their chance to meet. In essence, the Coleman court used Davis as a
scapegoat to avoid being labeled the proverbial "bad guy;" with Davis, the
Eleventh Circuit was able to alleviate enforcing a juvenile's deprivation of

1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 909 (1986) ("We see no reason to apply a different rule to
equivocal invocations of the right to cut off questioning").
239. Coleman v. Singletary, 30 F.3d 1420, 1425 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 1801 (1995).
240. Id. at 1424.
241. Id. at 1425.
242. Id. at 1424-25.
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available counsel. Undoubtedly, this was not the desired impact the
Supreme Court had hoped for in Davis.
Though numerous similarities exist, the Coleman case can still be
distinguished from Moran v. Burbine.243 The Moran Court specifically
held that deliberate deception of an attorney by the police, unbeknownst to
the defendant, has no bearing on that defendant's ability to assert or waive
their Miranda rights. 2 " In the Moran case, the defendant challenged how
valid his knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel truly was because police
did not inform him of the efforts of a public defender to contact him.245
The Court rejected the defendant's argument, saying "we have never read
the Constitution to require that the police supply a suspect with a flow of
information to help him calibrate his self-interest in deciding whether to
speak or stand by his rights."2' In the Coleman case, however, the police
did in fact inform the suspect that a public defender was trying to reach
him. Though this was not required by Moran, the transaction occurred
nonetheless. Thus, once the police asked whether he wanted to speak with
them, they were in effect dangling his attorney in front of him. After
considering this, the statement "I don't know, but if he said to stop it I don't
want to do what he said not to do" seems to be more of a request for
counsel, in viewing the totality of the circumstances. Moran says police
don't have to inform a suspect of his attorney's wishes; but once they do,
and the suspect makes a reference to complying with that attorney's desires,
common sense would dictate to clarify exactly what the suspect wants to do.
Other courts are applying the decision similarly. In United States v.
Sanchez,247 a suspected cocaine distributer, when asked specifically about
his alleged offense, responded "I can't say nothing.."248 The federal district
court in Kansas cited Davis in holding that the police officer in that situation
could have reasonably interpreted this statement to mean that the suspect
could not talk about the offense "for fear of reprisal by his cohorts, rather
than an invocation of his right to remain silent."24 9 In State v. Keko-

243. 475 U.S. 412 (1986); see also supra note 34 and accompanying text.
244. Id. at 422.
245. Id. at 418-21.
246. Id. at 422; see also Jones v. Dugger, 928 F.2d 1020, 1026-27 (11 th Cir.), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 216 (1991) (holding that an officer's denying a defendant the knowledge
that counsel obtained by defendant's family was attempting to reach defendant did not violate
that defendant's right to counsel).
247. 866 F. Supp. 1542 (D.Kan. 1994).
248. Id. at 1558.
249. Id. at 1559. It should also be noted that Sanchez was a native of Guatemala, with
Spanish as his native and first language. Id. at 1546.
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na,25 a criminal defendant who stated during interrogation "I no like talk
no more," was deemed not to have invoked his right to remain silent, this
despite the language barrier problems that existed due to the defendant's
native Hawaiian tongue.~" However, at least one court has used the Davis
rationale in the right to remain silent arena and found that the suspect did
2
in fact invoke his right to remain silent. In State v. Strayhand, the
Court of Appeals of Arizona interpreted the statement "Well I don't want
[to] answer anymore" to mean that the suspect was invoking his right to
remain silent, basing their decision upon the Davis holding. z 3 The court
did not address, however, whether this was also the case in the question of
whether that suspect was invoking his right to the presence of counsei at
interrogation.
This article makes no comment towards whether the Davis opinion
applies to invoking one's right to remain silent, and it is questionable
whether the above listed courts should do so either. The fact remains,
however, that this trend does in fact exist. Again, clearly one can invoke
his right to remain silent without having his attorney present, and the two
requests are clear and distinct. The Supreme Court surely did not anticipate
this noticeable trend when deciding Davis.
The Strayhanddecision is notable for another reason, which is precisely
the third noticeable trend among lower courts: these courts are consciously
choosing to ignore the Davis opinion as it applies to a suspect's equivocal
invocation of counsel's presence, and are instead looking to their own
constitutions and case law. The Strayhand court was quick to point out that
Davis does not require clarifying questions by police. 25 However, the
Court of Appeals of Arizona found it more prudent to adhere to their own
state law in requiring clarifying questioning on the part of police after an
equivocal reference to the presence of counsel.25 5 Arizona is not the only

250.
251.
252.
7, 1995).
253.
254.

Id.

886 P.2d 740 (Haw. 1994).
Id. at 744.
Nos. 1 CA-CR 921386, 1 CA-CR 921391, 1995 WL 525585 (Ariz. Ct. App. Sept.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 14. The Court stated:
We are aware of the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Davis
to the effect that there is no requirement under the United States Constitution that officers clarify an ambiguous request for counsel before proceeding with questioning .... Unless the Supreme Court of Arizona changes
the law, we will continue to follow the rule of [our case law].

255. Id. The court stated the following: "[Elven if the defendant's assertion is
susceptible to more than one interpretation, the limit of permissible continuing interrogation
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state using this rationale, even though the trend is very young. The Court
of Appeals of Wisconsin, in State v. Long,256 acknowledged that the
Wisconsin Constitution may override the Davis decision, but saved resolution of the matter for a later date.2" 7 However, in Deck v. State,258 the
District Court of Appeals of Florida for the Fifth District did in fact tackle
the issue, and ruled in favor of the Florida Constitution. There, while in
custodial interrogation, the suspect stated, "I can't talk about it anymore. ' 259
" The Florida court held that this was in fact an equivocal request
to remain silent, and further that all police questioning should have ceased
at that point; thus, admissions made after this statement were inadmissible
in court. 2"
The Deck holding, in deciding to adhere to the Florida Constitution,
cited as its advisory case26' State v. Hoey.262 Charged with robbery in
the first degree and kidnapping, Hoey was arrested and taken into custody
2 63
at the Honolulu Police Department, where detectives interrogated him.
Upon reading Hoey his rights, the detective asked the defendant whether he
wanted an attorney present for questioning; Hoey replied he didn't have the
money to buy one. 2' The detective reiterated "I'm just saying do you
think you'll need an attorney?", to which defendant replied "Right now, I
don't think so. ' 265 The defendant proceeded to waive his rights in writing,
immediately after the assertion would be for the sole purpose of ascertaining whether the
defendant intended to invoke his right to silence, or to waive this right." Id. (citing State v.
Finehout, 665 P.2d 570, 573 (Ariz. 1983)).
256. 526 N.W.2d 826 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).
257. Id. at 830 n.3. In this brief footnote, the court stated: "We do not decide whether
article I, Section 8(1) of the Wisconsin Constitution, which protects against self-incrimination, affords greater protection and requires that the police clarify ambiguous requests for
counsel and thus the matter is reserved for another day." Id.
258. 653 So. 2d 435 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
259. Id. at 435.
260. Id. at 436-37.
261. Id. at 436.
262. 881 P.2d 504 (Haw. 1994).
263. Id. at 508-09.
264. Id. at 509. The exact dialogue went as follows:
Detective: ". . . If you cannot afford an attorney--well, you also have a
right, I should say, to have an attorney present while I talk to you. If you
cannot afford an attorney, the court will appoint one for you. You think
you'll need an attorney now?"
Defendant: "I don't have the money to buy one."
Id.
265. Id. After this apparent oral waiver, the detective walked Hoey through the written
waiver form, essentially dictating to Hoey what Hoey's responses were. A portion of the
recorded conversation went as follows:
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26
too; questioning continued, and Hoey gave a detailed confession.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Hawaii rejected the trial court's
decision,2 67 and held that the prosecution did not effectively show the
defendant "voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right to
counsel." 2 Even though Hoey's statements were found to be equivocal,
the Hawaii Supreme Court nonetheless circumvented the recent Davis precedent 269 and chose to require clarifying questions after a suspect's ambigu-

Detective: "Okay. I'll go over would you like to tell me what happened,
but for now this is what I need for you to do. Initial where it says 'yes'
here [on the HPD Form 81]. You know why you're being arrested?"
Defendant: "Yes."
Detective: "Okay. Here it says, "Do you want an attorney now?" The
answer was 'no.' Is that correct?"
Defendant: "Yes."
Detective: "Okay. Now, do you understand what I've told you? Go ahead
and put 'yes."'
Id. at 2.
Upon reviewing the recorded conversation in Hoey, one is left to wonder whether
this isn't the exact sort of coercive environment Miranda v. Arizona and its progeny sought
to protect suspects from. Here, it would seem defendant was basically told how to answer
by interrogating officials, not by his attorney.
266. Hoey, 881 P.2d at 509.
267. Id. at 507. At the trial, defendant filed a "boilerplate" motion in limine seeking
an order to exclude and preclude use at trial of "all statements made by [defendant] to the
police prior to trial, and statements and commentary by the police upon [defendant's]
utterances[.]" Id. at 512. Defendant argued he didn't voluntarily and intelligently waive his
right to counsel, because he did not understand that court-appointed counsel would not cost
him anything. As his counsel argued, "[y]ou cannot voluntarily waive something that you
do not understand." Id.
Evidence at trial showed that Hoey appeared to understand what took place, and had
in fact previously been arrested, making him familiar with the criminal justice system. Id.
Further, the Trial Court found Hoey had graduated ninth grade and could read at an
intermediate level. Id. at 514. Based on these findings, and absent a showing of illness,
intoxication, and police threats, the trial court held Hoey had voluntarily given his confession
subsequent to a valid waiver of his right to choose counsel. Id.
268. Id. at 507.
269. While forced to spend a great deal of time acknowledging the Davis holding, the
Hoey court very cleverly avoided its application, leaving an evident distaste for the Supreme
Court's rationale without explicitly saying so. Though the Supreme Court of Hawaii "has
always been mindful of its obligation to 'afford defendants the minimum protection required
by federal interpretations of the ... Federal Constitution,...."', here, as the "ultimate judicial
tribunal with final, unreviewable authority to interpret and enforce the Hawaii Constitution,"
the court chose to afford greater deference to the Hawaii State Constitution. Id. at 523
(citing State v. Hutch, 861 P.2d 11, 19 (Haw. 1993)). Thus, the Davis decision was ignored,
and the Hoey court gave its citizens greater protection under the state constitution.
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ous waiver, as they had so required prior to Davis.27 ° Consequently,
Hoey's statement "I don't have the money to buy one," was held ambiguous,
and the confession should have been suppressed absent the detective's
clarifying questions.27'
The Hoey case presents an interesting scenario; for an easy trap for
courts to fall into is to study Hoey's statement "Right now, I don't think
so," and conclude that he affirmatively waived his right to have counsel
present. This conclusion would be fatally flawed, however. Courts must
scrutinize a suspect's initial response to the question of counsel, here "I
don't have the money to buy one." As the Supreme Court of Hawaii
correctly held, this is neither an affirmative waiver nor a request of
counsel's presence; rather, it was obvious that Hoey did not understand his
given rights. Under the Davis rationale, this equivocal response would not
require the cessation of police questioning. In a compelling decision,
however, the Supreme Court of Hawaii chose to override the Davis holding
and require clarifying questions to be posed. It was not made clear to Hoey
that despite his monetary situation, the court could still provide him with
counsel if he so desired. Under Davis rationale, this suspect's ignorance of
his own rights would be overlooked in the selfish hopes of attaining an
unassisted confession. The Supreme Court of Hawaii saw this potential
defective logic and chose to require police clarification in this case. The
Hoey case is a poignant example of why the Davis decision cannot be used
to establish a per se rule on equivocal waivers of the right to have counsel
present during questioning; confusion as to one's rights does not amount to
a knowing and intelligent waiver of those rights.272
What these decisions seem to be pointing to is that the Davis holding
has done and will do little to solve the ambiguous waiver dilemma, for the
desired result of unanimity among lower courts has not been met. For
example, the Menzer court and others in the first noted trend have
essentially used the Davis decision as a scapegoat for addressing the
problems of Davis. The second listed group of courts have expanded the
decision to address the issue of equivocal references to the right to remain

270. This approach, recall, is the third approach outlined in Smith v. Illinois that most
jurisdictions align themselves with. See supra notes 55, 57-58 and accompanying text.
271. Hoey, 881 P.2d at 523.
272. This is not to say, though, that the Supreme Court of Hawaii has found the
impeccable per se rule to be applied, either. Their approach proved most feasible in this
specific fact pattern; it may not necessarily prove prudent in every situation. What should
be drawn from this case is that first, the Davis rationale is not perfectly tailored for all
situations, and second, that the Davis decision has not achieved the perfect unanimity among
lower courts it had set out to accomplish.
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silent. The Hoey court, and others in the third grouping, not only avoided
addressing these and other questions, but also avoided Supreme Court precedent, an act fully within their power. The Davis decision is apparently so
impalatable to the State of Hawaii that they will continue to apply their own
precedent to the ambiguous waiver of the right to counsel question. So,
again, the Davis decision failed to effectively address the issues it had hoped
to conquer.
As these decisions show, and a myriad future decisions will likely
continue to show, the Davis decision has done little if not nothing to solve
the question of equivocal waivers of the right to counsel. Questions still
exist such as what exactly an equivocal statement is, and when clarifying
questions (since Davis holds they can be posed) actually become police
coercion in an intimidating environment. Further, the decision is being used
to ignore references to counsel where suspects are apparently confused; this
confusion, most likely, is the result of the inherently coercive environment
of the interrogation setting. It would appear, for now, that lower courts are
using the decision as a scapegoat to avoid these questions, or else not
closely examining the decision at all; this, of course, is never the desired
effect of a United States Supreme Court precedent.
VI. PROPOSAL

273

On May 13, 1994, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin decided the case
of State v. Walkowiak 274 just one month before the Davis v. United States
decision. The defendant, upon police interrogation, asked "Do you think I
need an attorney? '275 With no guiding Davis precedent, the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin concluded that this was in fact an equivocal question,
not meriting the defendant's right to counsel. 6 However, following the
majority opinion, Justice Abrahamson wrote a compelling opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. 2 77 Though she agreed that the question
was indeed equivocal, the police response of having the defendant sign a

273. Please understand before reading this section that the proposal I offer is solely
historical, based on cases and articles I have encountered in my research. Those who have
encountered this dilemma in practice are undoubtedly far more able to offer a unique
perspective on this issue than I am at this point in my career. So take this section for what
it is meant to be--a proposal based upon a historical analysis of case law.
274. 515 N.W.2d 863 (Wis. 1994).
275. Id. at 864.
276. Id. at 867. This, of course, is the very result the United States Supreme Court
would have arrived at.
277. Id. at 869-74 (Abrahamson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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waiver form was not the proper clarification needed subsequent to this
ambiguous reference.
Abrahamson outlined precisely what she felt
interrogating officers should ask following such an equivocal response:
I have to stop questioning you now because I am not sure whether
you want a lawyer. You have a right to consult with a lawyer and
to have the lawyer present during questioning. If you cannot
afford a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you. You will
not be punished for deciding not to speak with me now, and you
will not be rewarded for talking with me now. If you talk with
me now, anything you say can be used against you in court. Do
you want a lawyer?" 8
This paragraph, written just prior to the Davis decision, seems to solve
many of the open questions left by Davis. If used after an equivocal
statement, this universally applied clarifying paragraph could solve the
remaining discrepancies left by Davis. The only lingering question would
be when exactly an ambiguous statement would require this paragraph to be
read; however, even in the worst case scenario, if there is any doubt in a
police officer's mind, this paragraph could be read. Even if the court deems
that the paragraph's reading was unnecessary in a situation, no harm is done
by reading it. Justice Abrahamson of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin may
have inadvertently solved the Davis problem before the Supreme Court had
even turned it into a problem.
Though facially this appears to be the cure-all solution to the ambiguous waiver paradox, there may be potential problems. A case like State v.
Hoey, admittedly, is perfectly tailored for Justice Abrahamson's speech.279
There, where the defendant was unaware of his right to court appointed
counsel, Abrahamson's speech would be custom fit. However, recall
Coleman v. Singletary.2" There, the fifteen-year-old suspect had a public
defender seeking him out with silencing instructions, but was denied the
opportunity to speak with her. Consequently, when the young suspect
replied he didn't want to do what the attorney had said not to do (and he
didn't even know what that was), the court held his statement an ambiguous
request requiring officer clarification. Here, Justice Abrahamson's speech
may not be effective. How could an interrogating official state "I have to
stop questioning you now because I am not sure whether you want a
lawyer," when, after being informed of the attorney's efforts, the boy ap

278. Sd. dt 870-7 1.
279. See supra notes 260-69 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 225-44 and accompanying text.
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pears to be clearly expressing a desire to comply with his hidden coun28
sel? '
Yet, even beyond this conflict, the Abrahamson model (as I will call
it) may in fact prove quite effective. The Coleman scenario is one where,
even at the very least, the speech could certainly do no harm and can only
clear up police confusion. The same would hold true for nearly all
imaginable fact patterns. Nonetheless, in an intimidating interrogation
environment leading to inherent suspect confusion, such a wordy speech
may leave a potential taint of coercion. Perhaps the speech could be
tailored, laying all the cards on the table, so to speak:
Due to recent modifications in interrogation procedures, I'm afraid
I can't accept any answer other than an affirmative 'yes' or 'no.'
If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent
you. If you don't exercise your right to counsel, anything you say
can be used against you in court. Would you like to speak with
a lawyer at this time?
Though similar to the Abrahamson model, the modified speech explains
in plain, concise language what the required possible answers are and what
the effects of either decision will be. As a further safeguard to the inherent
coercion of an interrogation environment, the speech could be written
instead of spoken. The written speech could be passed to the suspect upon
an ambiguous reference to counsel, and the suspect would be required to
both sign her name to the paper and state orally, "Yes, I want an attorney,"
or "No, I do not want an attorney." Such a process would eliminate the
opportunity to intimidate the suspect, whether purposefully or inadvertently,
through voice inflection, intonation, and physical gestures. In addition, the
modification removes any traces of coercion from wordiness and informs the
suspect exactly what the Supreme Court requires of them, instead of
misplacing a greater burden on the suspect (as the Davis decision did) to
clairvoyantly know what is required of her.282 As Justice Souter expressed
at Court in Davis, the Supreme Court has been quite successful in the past
at penning an effective procedure to protect suspects' rights to counsel, as
accomplished in Miranda. This new proposal should not be viewed as

281. Admittedly, the Coleman decision may not involve the best fact pattern for a Davis
application. Several other issue handling flaws exist, such as the boy's right to speak with
available counsel. Nonetheless, the Coleman court addressed Davis, and this paper will
address it accordingly.
282. In large part, the Abrahamson model is nearly flawless. The new modification is
a proposal based solely on the idea that the more an interrogating official speaks, especially
in a "rapid-fire" manner, the more coercion is present upon a frightened suspect. The
proposed modification hopefully trims wordiness to an absolute bare minimum.
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another layer of protection, as the Davis Court would like to view it, but
rather as an assurance that both the suspects' rights and police rights are
best served justice. With so many cases still reaching the courts involving
confusion of rights by suspects, and further confusion by police as to
handling the situation, perhaps the time has come to "run a system for
idiots."
CONCLUSION

The requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is
fundamental with respect to the Fifth Amendment
privilege and not simply a preliminary ritual to existing
283
methods of interrogation.
As this quote from Miranda v. Arizona clearly states, the Miranda
warnings do not exist solely to maintain procedural consistency; they are
also designed to inform a suspect of his given rights and that those rights
have now taken effect. A suspect in custodial interrogation has a constitutional right to having counsel present during questioning, as well as an interest in being made aware of this right. Law enforcement officials have an
interest in obtaining clear-cut confessions from suspects. These law
enforcement officers and society in general, however, have the greatest
interest in seeing justice properly served. When interrogation coercion
interferes with a suspect's right to counsel, justice is not properly being
served. Justice is certainly the highest interest in relation to convenient,
potentially false confessions.
When a suspect equivocally invokes his right to counsel's presence
during custodial interrogation, police must carefully handle the situation so
as to preserve the suspect's constitutional rights; then, and only then, justice
is best served. Davis v. United States attempted to unify lower courts'
handling of the ambiguous waiver question. By concluding that an
equivocal waiver is the equivalent of an affirmative waiver, however, the
Supreme Court has merely befuddled the delicate issue by providing courts
with a new scapegoat precedent. The Supreme Court has impermissibly
outweighed a suspect's constitutional rights with the police's coerced,
convenient confessions, thus defeating the goals of Miranda v. Arizona and
its progeny. The decision presents the ultimate catch-22: attorneys need to
advise their clients that they must affirmatively say, in no uncertain terms,
that they want their lawyer present, yet these lawyers can't tell their clients
this until the client has invoked that right. As stated in Miranda: "The
283. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 476.
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accused who does not know his rights and therefore does not make a request
may be the person who most needs counsel. ' 2 4
A more compelling approach may be a modified version of the
Abrahamson model.28 5 Such a universally practiced written speech would
preserve suspects' rights, deter police coercion, and inform suspects exactly
what is now impliedly required of them, while still leaving open the
possibility of a confession; in short, justice would be best served. This
article was not meant to advocate the reversal of every decision using a
Davis analysis on equivocal waivers. Rather, this article was designed to
show that the cost of remedying the situation at the source, rather than in
court, is relatively low. Until this Abrahamson approach or a variation
thereof is considered, lower courts will continue to further grapple with the
goals of law enforcement, with a Supreme Court precedent providing little
problem-solving value. Unfortunately for Justice Scalia, it appears that we
do in fact need to "run a system for idiots."
WILLIAM G. WOROBEC

284. Id. at 470-7 1.
285. See supra notes 276-80 and accompanying text.

